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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers the future direction of Japanese security policy by 
examining the debate on whether or not Japan will “normalize.”  Normalization is 
defined as the process of Japan removing its restrictions on the use of military force.  
Arguments exist that Japan is on the path to removing these restrictions because of a 
variety of factors such as Japan’s worsening security environment and its recent decision 
to introduce a ballistic missile defense (BMD) program.  In contrast to these views, this 
thesis suggests that Japan will not normalize due to the presence of strong anti-military 
feelings that exist within the society, both at the public and political levels.  To test this 
hypothesis public opinion, politician opinions, and political party opinions are researched 
on four issues:  general Constitutional revision, specific revision of Article 9, possible 
changes in the right to exercise collective self-defense, and opinions on Japan’s new 
BMD program.  It is concluded that strong anti-military feelings continue to persist at 
both levels of Japanese society and that these feelings are an effective obstacle to Japan’s 
normalization.  Based on this conclusion, it is recommended that the United States 
increase its efforts to secure Japan’s participation in non-combat-related activities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Among security experts, the future direction of Japan’s security policy has been 
an issue of debate for many years.  Part of the debate revolves around the question of if 
Japan will ever become a “normal” country by removing the restrictions that exist on its 
ability to use military force.  This thesis will shed some light on this question by 
examining certain aspects of the domestic Japanese security debate to determine what 
they suggest about whether or not Japan is about to “normalize” by removing its long-
standing restrictions on the use of military force. 1  The aspects to be examined are:  the 
opinions of the Japanese public, the opinions of Japanese politicians, and the opinions of 
Japan’s political parties.  These areas were chosen because they represent a broad 
sampling of how Japanese society in general thinks about these issues.  The results of this 
examination will then be analyzed to determine if “normalization” is a possibility for 
Japan’s future security policy. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This research question is important because Japanese normalization could 
potentially have severe ramifications on U.S. national security in two vital areas.  First, if 
Japan were to remove the existing restrictions on the use of military force, it could have a 
major impact on the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, which has been the cornerstone of U.S. 
policy in Asia for over six decades.  Second, such a decision would run the risk of 
negatively affecting the regional security and stability of East Asia, an area of increasing 
importance to the economy and security of the United States. 
First, a significant change to Japan’s security policy could have a tremendous 
effect on the existing U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.  Everything from the scope of the 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this thesis, “normalization” is defined as Japan removing its restrictions on the 
use of military force; specifically Article 9 and the prohibition of collective self-defense.  This author 
acknowledges that others may define it differently. 
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alliance to the level of defense cooperation between both countries could be subject to 
change.  On the positive side, Japan could become more of an equal partner within the 
alliance and bear more of the burden for maintaining security in the region, as well as 
internationally.  This would improve the effectiveness and the significance of the alliance. 
Conversely, if Japan removed its restrictions on the use of military force, it could 
also decide that there was no longer a need for the alliance to exist.  Instead, Japan could 
take a more independent path without a close relationship with the United States.  This 
would lead to a decrease in the U.S. presence in East Asia as well as a corresponding loss 
of influence and prestige in the region. 
Second, Japan’s removal of its restrictions could have profound repercussions on 
the regional security and stability of East Asia.  Many of Japan’s neighbors, especially 
China and the two Koreas, would view this development with anxiety and suspicion.  
This could lead to an arms race between Japan and its neighbors that could destabilize the 
region and possibly lead to conflict.  The probability that the U.S. would be involved 
militarily in this type of scenario is high.  It is also possible that this event could lead to a 
change in the existing security structure within East Asia.  An unconstrained Japan might 
force a change in the current U.S. system of bilateral security agreements that are in place.  
How would the new Japan fit into the existing regional setting? 
Given these possible developments, the direction Japan takes with its future 
security policy could have a considerable impact on the national interests of the United 
States.  In light of this, an examination of the current debate within Japan itself will 
provide greater understanding of the potential direction Japan may take in the future.  
This understanding will also allow the United States to be better prepared for any 
ramifications on the U.S.-Japan alliance and on the regional security and stability of East 
Asia. 
C. ISSUES 
The primary issue addressed by this thesis involves Japan’s restrictions on the use 
of military force.  The two restrictions that will be addressed by this thesis are Article 9  
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of the 1947 Constitution and the prohibition on the right of collective self-defense (CSD).  
Other restrictions do exist, such as Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principle for example, but 
these will not be discussed. 
Many people have heard of the Japanese Constitution’s Article 9, but probably 
few have actually read it.  It is composed of two paragraphs and states: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.2 
This article has fueled an intense debate that has lasted for decades in Japan.  It 
remains a topic of great sensitivity and has, at times, caused tension in Japan’s 
relationship with the United States.  This is particularly ironic given the U.S. role in 
creating it in the first place.  Despite the strict wording of the article, Japan has 
interpreted it to mean that Japan has the right to maintain a Self-Defense Force (SDF), 
but the roles and responsibilities of the SDF are very narrow. 
The second restriction is Japan’s prohibition on participating in CSD.  CSD, or 
cooperating with other states for security purposes, is a right that is recognized by the 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.  That article states: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.3 
                                                 
2 Constitution of Japan, Article 9, website of the Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, available at:  
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (accessed 
March 22, 2009).  The website provided the English translation. 
3United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51, website of the United Nations, available at: 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (accessed March 22, 2009). 
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Despite this, the Japanese government has deemed that participating in CSD is not 
a right that Japan’s Constitution allows.  The annual white paper entitled “The Defense of 
Japan 2007” summarized the stance as follows: 
International law permits a state to have the right of collective self-
defense, which is the right to use force to stop an armed attack on a 
foreign country with which the state has close relations, even if the state 
itself is not under direct attack.  Since Japan is a sovereign state, it 
naturally has the right of collective self-defense under international law.  
Nevertheless, the Japanese Government believes that the exercise of the 
right of collective self-defense exceeds the limit of self-defense authorized 
under Article 9 of the Constitution and is not permissible.4 
Thus, these two restrictions prevent Japan from officially maintaining a military 
and from participating with other countries in self-defense.  There are two methods that 
Japan could employ to remove these restrictions.  First, Japan could either rewrite or 
amend its Constitution to remove the restrictions of Article 9.  Second, Japan could 
change its current interpretation regarding its prohibition on the ability to exercise the 
right of CSD.  Taking either of these actions would result in a removal of Japan’s 
restrictions and cause significant changes to Japan’s security policy. 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
There are some who believe that Japan is on the road to removing its restrictions 
on the use of military force.  They cite a variety of reasons, including Japan’s worsening 
security environment and Japan’s current BMD program as evidence to support their 
arguments.  By contrast, the hypothesis presented in this thesis suggests that Japan is not 
about to remove its current restrictions on the use of military force because of the 
strength of anti-military feelings that exist within the society, both at the political and 
public level.  This thesis thus predicts that Japan will continue to implement its security 
policy within the restrictions created by Article 9 and the prohibition of CSD. 
                                                 
4 Defense of Japan 2007, Part II “The Basics of Japan’s Defense Policy,” Chapter 1, Section II “The 
Constitution and the Right of Self Defense,” Paragraph  2, Subparagraph 4, p. 111, website of Japan’s 
Ministry of Defense, available at: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/21Part2_Chap1_Sec2.pdf (accessed March 22, 2009). 
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As stated above, this thesis uses the single term “restrictions” to refer to only two 
separate aspects: Article 9 and the prohibition of the exercise of the right to CSD.  When 
this thesis mentions “restrictions,” the reader should understand that it is referring to both 
concepts.  Therefore, the hypothesis states that Japan will neither revise Article 9 nor 
remove its ban on CSD. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Japan Will Not Remove its Restrictions 
Numerous political scientists interested in questions of “national identity” have 
pointed out that the norm of pacifism, which has sprung up within post-World War II 
Japan, plays a major role in restraining Japan’s security policies.  Thomas Berger calls 
this norm, “Japan’s culture of anti-militarism”5.  He contends, “The experience of defeat, 
and how that experience came to be interpreted and institutionalized in the Japanese 
political system and in Japanese defense policy, continue [sic] to shape Japan’s 
willingness to make use of the military today.”6   Berger concludes: 
…I have argued that it is highly unlikely that the Japanese would set out to 
become a military superpower.  Even if Japanese policy makers were to 
conclude that dramatic change was necessary, given the existing culture of 
anti-militarism they would encounter strong opposition from the general 
populace as well as from large sections of the elite.7 
Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara agree.  They claim that Japan’s security 
policy is swayed by both the structure of the state as well as legal and social norms.8  
They reject realist arguments that changes in the international system are responsible for 
Japan’s security policy9 and conclude that, “Both state structure and social and legal 
                                                 
5Thomas Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism,” International 
Security 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993). 
6Ibid., p. 131. 
7Ibid., p. 147. 
8 Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security:  Structures, Norms, and 
Policies,” International Security 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993): p. 86. 
9 Ibid., p. 116. 
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norms explain why Japan’s security policy has eschewed the traditional trappings of 
military status and power.”10  They do, however, leave the possibility open that large 
changes in the international system may cause Japan to change its security policy.11 
Mike Mochizuki also emphasizes the importance of norms.  He argues, “Despite 
the emergence of the so-called new nationalism in Japan, the possibility of a strategic 
breakout involving both remilitarization…and security independence from the United 
States remains remote.  The anti-military pacifist culture is still robust enough in Japan to 
check moves in this direction.”12  He does, however, acknowledge that this could change.  
He states, “The only development that could drive Japan in this direction would be a 
drastic weakening of the U.S. security commitment in the context of a more militarily 
powerful and threatening China.”13 
Yoshihide Soeya also argues on the strength of this norm.  He states, “Of 
particular importance in the Japanese context is the persistent strength of ‘pacifism’ as 
the most critical reference point informing the content and the policy making process of 
security policy.”14  He argues that Japan is actually transforming this norm into a new 
strategy that he calls “proactive pacifism with an internationalist bent.”15  He claims, 
“[Japan’s] Greater participation in international peace keeping operations, the rise of 
human security, and renewed attention to regional community building are clear cases of  
 
 
                                                 
10 Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security:  Structures, Norms, and 
Policies,” International Security 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993): p. 115. 
11 Ibid., p. 117. 
12 Mike Mochizuki, “Japan:  Between Alliance and Autonomy,” in Strategic Asia 2004-05:  
Confronting Terrorism in the pursuit of Power, eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, 
Washington:  National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), p. 128. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Yoshihide Soeya, “Redefining Japan’s Security Profile:  International Security, Human Security, 
and an East Asian Community,” Institute for International Policy Studies International Conference speech, 
given November 30 – December 1, 2004, p. 2, website of the Institute for International Policy Studies, 
available at:  http://www.iips.org/04sec/04asiasec_soeya.pdf (accessed March 22, 2009). 
15Ibid. 
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this internationalist pacifism of post-Cold War Japan.”16  He argues that this new type of 
pacifism has arisen “in parallel with, not despite” the threat from North Korea and the 
concern over the rise of China.17 
2. Japan Will Remove its Restrictions 
Christopher Layne argued back in 1993 that Japan could be on its way to great 
power status.  He discusses the post-Cold War world and explains how Germany and 
Japan have increased their relative power.18  He then argues, “As their stakes in the 
international system deepen, so will their ambitions and interests.  Security 
considerations will cause Japan and Germany to emulate the United States and acquire 
the full spectrum of great power capabilities, including nuclear weapons.”19   In the 
sixteen years since this article was published, this has not occurred.  However, Layne’s 
prediction seems contingent upon Japan continuing to increase its economic power 
relative to the United States which has not occurred.20 
More recently, Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon think Japan’s security policy 
may ultimately result in the removal of the restrictions on military power.  They claim 
that, pacifism will be one of the key components of Japan’s security policy during the 
years 2005 to 2020.21  But they go on to predict that “…constitutional revisions are more  
likely to take place during the 2005-2020 period.  If the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] 
continues to hold power in one way or another, as it seems set to, constitutional revisions  
 
                                                 
16Yoshihide Soeya, “Redefining Japan’s Security Profile:  International Security, Human Security, and 
an East Asian Community,” Institute for International Policy Studies International Conference speech, 
given November 30 – December 1, 2004, p. 2, website of the Institute for International Policy Studies, 
available at:  http://www.iips.org/04sec/04asiasec_soeya.pdf (accessed March 22, 2009). 
17Ibid. 
18 Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion:  Why New Great powers Will Rise,” International 
Security 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 37. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., pp. 42-43.  On page 51, Layne also predicted conflict between Japan and the United States if 
Japan continues to grow in power. 
21 Takeshi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, “Rethinking Japan as an Ordinary Country,” in The United States 
and Northeast Asia, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon (Lanham MD:  Rowman and Littlefield, 
2007):p. 93. 
 8
are likely to take the following form:  endorsement of the ordinary use of force in the 
settlement of international disputes…”22  They explain their rationale based on domestic 
politics: 
…The LDP contains a large group of legislators who talk tough on self-
strengthening.  The LDP is more likely to endorse the overseas 
deployment of troops than the DPJ [Democratic Party of Japan], and less 
concerned than the DPJ about whether such a dispatch is authorized by a 
UN Security Council resolution or not.  The LDP would countenance the 
dispatch of Japanese forces to join a coalition not authorized by the UN, 
whereas the DPJ would not.23 
Finally, they do also state that their prediction does not mean that Japan will 
engage in “adventurism,” because Japan will remain close to the United States and will 
therefore be constrained by that relationship.24 
Christopher Hughes predicts that Japan will partially remove its restrictions 
because of its external security environment.  He states: 
Japan’s evolving security policy has been occasioned by the changed 
strategic environment and a series of key security crises in the East Asia 
region and beyond.  The Gulf War, the North Korean nuclear crises, the 
Taiwan Crisis, the rise of China, 11 September and the ‘war on terror’ 
have all convinced Japan that the status quo in its security policy and the 
strategic bargain with the US are no longer tenable in their current form..25 
He goes on to say that Japan is “…increasingly shifting to a position that the route 





                                                 
22 Takeshi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, “Rethinking Japan as an Ordinary Country,” in The United States 
and Northeast Asia, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon (Lanham MD:  Rowman and Littlefield, 
2007):p. 94. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 95. 
25Christopher Hughes, “Japan’s shifting security trajectory and policy system,” Adelphi Papers 44, 
Issue 368 & 369 (November 2004): p. 140. 
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JSDF [Japanese SDF] dispatch and the gradual abandonment of previous constitutional 
constraints, including, most notably, the exercise of the right of collective self-
defence.”[Italics added]26 
He also predicted that a revision of Article 9 may occur, but this revision would 
likely not be a removal of restrictions, but rather, “…to specify the existence of the JSDF 
[Japan Self-Defense Force] as a military force, and to clarify the right of collective self-
defense and legitimize the JSDF’s role in international cooperation with the US and 
UN.”27  However, he also says, “If [North Korea’s nuclear program or China’s military 
ambitions] were to become clear and immediate threats to Japan, then, combined with the 
trends that have served to raise Japan’s national military profile in recent years, Japan 
could quickly reveal itself as a fully fledged military great power.”28 
Michael Green’s assessment also predicts a partial removal of restrictions.  
Discussing the future direction of Japan’s security policy, he states, “Eventually the Diet 
will probably also revise the Constitution, with incremental changes to recognize the 
right of [collective self-defense].”29  He believes this change will occur because of “…the 
economic problems Japan faces, by the growing sense of vulnerability to China and 
North Korea, and by generational change.”30  However, Green also mentions that there 
are several factors, such as a conflict over Taiwan or on the Korean Peninsula among 
others, which could be a catalyst towards large changes in Japan’s security policies.31 
Additionally, several authors point out that Japan’s implementation of a BMD 
program will collide with its prohibition on the exercise of collective self defense.  Amy 
 
                                                 
26 Christopher Hughes, “Japan’s shifting security trajectory and policy system,” Adelphi Papers 44, 
Issue 368 & 369 (November 2004): p. 140. 
27 Ibid., p. 65. 
28 Ibid., p. 18. 
29 Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York City, New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 272.  
The original text does not say “collective self-defense” but “collective defense”.  This author has confirmed 
with Green that he used that term synonymously with CSD. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., pp. 276-277. 
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Freedman and Robert Gray speculate that the close cooperation needed to successfully 
operate a missile defense system will touch on “collective defense” and cause problems 
within the Japanese government.32 
Aurelia Mulgan agrees.  She says, “While the Japanese government insists that 
introducing such a system [BMD] will not breach any constitutional prohibition, and that 
it will develop an independent system that defends only Japanese territory, it will be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Japan to avoid being drawn into the collective 
defense of U.S. forces in East Asia and even on the continental United States.”33   She 
goes on to speculate, “From a U.S. perspective, Japan’s prohibition on exercising the 
right of collective self-defence is a constraint on alliance cooperation.  Hence Japan’s 
participation in missile defence represents an opportunity to force a Japanese breach of 
the ban on collective self-defence through the backdoor.”34 
Mulgan continues, “In this way, missile defence will act as an important agent of 
change in the alliance. By driving policy on collective self-defence, increasing integration 
of US and Japanese forces, including coordination of Japanese and American MD 
systems, will act as bottom-up method of transforming the US-Japan alliance into a 
normal alliance.”35  Her idea here highlights how the nature of the BMD program itself 
may impel Japan to resolve its restrictions on CSD. 
Finally, there are also some experts who point out the inadequacy of the argument 
regarding Japan’s anti-military norms.  Toshio Nagahisa, for one, does not believe these 
norms are the driving reason for defense policy.  He gives the example of how Japan 
continued with the SDF’s activities in Indian Ocean and sent the SDF to Iraq despite 
                                                 
32Amy Freedman and Robert Gray, “The Implications of Missile Defense for Northeast Asia,” Orbis 
48, No. 2 (Spring 2004): p. 344.  Freedman and Gray also use the term “collective defense.”  This author 
assumes that CSD is what they are referring to. 
33Aurelia Mulgan, “Japan’s Defence Dilemma,” Security Challenges 1, No. 1 (November 2005): p. 63. 
34Ibid., p. 64. 
35 Ibid., p. 65. 
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strong public opposition.36  He states, “In short, while politicians may take advantage of 
public opinion when it supports them, their decisions are not controlled by public  
opinion.”37  Instead, he argues that, “…Japan expanded its security commitments because 
Japan had a “right” person as the Prime Minister under the “right” institutions when 
external and internal factors demanded to do so.”38 
Jennifer Lind also questions the argument for norms.  She convincingly argues 
that Japan’s post-World War II foreign policy was never based on anti-military norms but 
is better explained by the motivation to “pass the buck” to its stronger alliance partner, 
the United States.39  Thus, Nagahisa and Lind cast doubt about the argument on the 
strength of Japan’s anti-military norms. 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will rely on both primary and secondary sources for information.  
Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the original Japanese are by the author.  The 
basic analytical approach will be the case study method.  It will be an examination of 
three facets of the Japanese security debate.  The three facets that will be researched are 
public opinion data, surveys of politicians, and the opinions of political parties. 
For public opinion data, it will examine public opinion polls published by major 
newspapers within Japan and the government of Japan.  For survey data of politicians, 
this thesis will examine the results of surveys by major newspapers in Japan as well as 
data from collaboration between the Asahi Shimbun (newspaper) and the University of 
Tokyo.  Finally, the opinions of Japan’s two biggest political parties, the LDP and the 
DPJ, shall be examined by studying policy documents that they have published. 
                                                 
36 Toshio Nagahisa, “Reasons that Activated Japan in Security Commitments: Shocks, Sentiments, 
Institutions and Prime Minister,” PHP Research Institute, Inc. March 10, 2007, p. 14, website of Yale 
University, available at: http://research.yale.edu/eastasianstudies/japanworld/nagahisa.pdf (accessed March 
22, 2009). 
37Ibid. 
38Ibid., p. 22. 
39Jennifer Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?  Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” 
International Security 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004): p. 93. 
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G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will examine the opinions of the public, opinions of Japanese 
politicians, and Japanese political parties on four key issues:  Constitutional revision, 
Article 9 revision, the exercise of the right of CSD, and opinions about the BMD 
program.  The opinions on each of these four issues will suggest whether or not Japan is 
going to remove its restrictions on the use of military force.  Additionally, a justification 
for the relevance and importance of opinion polls and political party documents will be 
explained in the appropriate chapters. 
To determine the opinions of the Japanese populace, public opinion polls from 
major Japanese newspapers and the Japanese government shall be studied.  By examining 
public opinion on the four key issues mentioned above, this data will offer insights into 
the minds of the Japanese citizenry and will help determine if a political mandate exists 
for Japan to remove its restrictions.  If a large portion of the public supports a removal of 
these restrictions, it is likely that politicians would be willing to move forward with 
change.  Conversely, if the public does not support removing the restrictions, it is not 
likely a change to these restrictions is forthcoming. 
Next, the opinions of Japanese politicians will be analyzed by examining the 
results of survey data.  Japanese news organizations and universities periodically conduct 
surveys to determine where politicians stand on various issues.  While politicians’ 
opinions do not directly drive policy, they are still valuable because they reveal general 
thoughts and attitudes about issues and thus suggest how future policies may be shaped.  
The survey results will be examined to understand how Japanese politicians think about 
the four key issues.  These results will then be compared with the public opinion data.  If 
both politicians and the public are in favor of removing Japan’s restrictions, then there is 
a good possibility that it will occur.  On the other hand, if both politicians and the public 
do not support it, it is highly unlikely that it will occur. 
Then, this thesis will investigate the opinions of Japan’s two major political 
parties, the LDP and the DPJ, as expressed by their published documents.  This 
information is different from the opinions expressed by politicians in a survey.  It 
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represents the consensus views of the parties and thus is a good reflection of how the 
various politicians had to compromise with others to reach a mutually agreeable policy.  
This thesis will not examine the views of other political parties in Japan due to their 
relatively small size compared to the LDP and DPJ.  Because of this, they are arguably 
less influential in determining the future course of Japan’s security policy. 
Then, this thesis will test some of the arguments made for Japan removing its 
restrictions.  Based on the literature review, these arguments are represented by the 
following two statements:  1) Japan will remove its restrictions because of its worsening 
security environment; 2) Japan’s involvement in BMD will force Japan to allow the 
exercise of CSD.  Finally, this thesis will make a determination regarding the validity of 
the hypothesis based on the evidence and offer some thoughts on implications for U.S. 
policy.  
 14
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II. PUBLIC OPINION 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine Japanese public opinion polls to 
determine how the public feels about removing the restrictions on the use of military 
force.  In any democracy, public opinion is an important bellwether for political action.  
Policies with strong public support tend to be pursued, while those with low support 
normally do not.  Despite this, there are some who argue about the relevancy and 
influence of public opinion polls on actual policy making.  Nagahisa expressed this idea 
in Chapter I with the following statement, “In short, while politicians may take advantage 
of public opinion when it supports them, their decisions are not controlled by public 
opinion.”40 
This is an interesting point and should be addressed.  First, this thesis does not 
argue that public opinion data is always an influential factor for politicians as they decide 
on policy.  There are certainly times when public opinion polls and government policies 
diverge.  However, there is nothing about Japan that would suggest public opinion polls 
do not have some influence on politicians.  It is likely that a political price would have to 
be paid by a politician pursuing unpopular policies.  Therefore, politicians would be 
aware of public opinions on many issues and take them into consideration. 
In Japan, however, public opinion takes on additional significance when dealing 
with constitutional issues.  This is due to the strict requirements for the passage of 
constitutional amendments stipulated by the Japanese Constitution.  The text of that 
passage reads: 
CHAPTER IX AMENDMENTS 
Article 96. 
Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a 
concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House 
and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall 
                                                 
40Nagahisa, “Reasons that Activated Japan in Security Commitments: Shocks, Sentiments, Institutions 
and Prime Minister,” p. 14. 
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require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a 
special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify. 
Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the 
Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution. 
[Italics added for emphasis] 41 
The Japanese Constitution requires not only that a two-thirds majority from each 
house, but also that a majority of the population must vote for the amendment in a 
national referendum.  The inclusion of the need for a national referendum makes public 
opinion data so influential in this debate because strong polling data on either side of the 
argument could be the deciding factor on which direction Japan’s future security policy 
will take.  However, it should be taken into consideration that some of these opinions 
may change within the focused environment of a national referendum debate on 
Constitutional revision.  With that in mind, it is still reasonable to assume that the polling 
data presented in this chapter is an accurate representation of Japanese public opinion. 
Additionally, it must be acknowledged that the above argument is only valid for 
Constitutional revision.  It is possible for the prohibition on the exercise of the right of 
CSD to be lifted without a Constitutional revision.  Thus, public opinion does not have a 
direct impact on the issue of CSD.  However, it is possible that very strong public opinion 
may have an influence on politicians as they decide matters of policy.  Therefore, public 
opinion data on the issue of CSD is presented. 
This chapter will now explore the available public opinion data to see how 
Japanese citizens think and feel about Japan’s restrictions on the use of military force.  
The data will be presented topically and will focus on the four key issues that are relevant 
to this thesis:  Constitutional revision, Article 9 revision, CSD, and BMD. 
                                                 
41 Constitution of Japan, Article 9, website of the Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, available 
at: http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (accessed 
March 22, 2009).  The website has provided the English translation. 
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A. CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 
For many years, the Constitution has been a regular topic of research by Japanese 
public opinion polls.  There are a variety of organizations that conduct polls probing 
people’s thoughts on almost every aspect of the document.  Of all the available polls, the 
Yomiuri Shimbun, a major newspaper, has shown to be the most consistent regarding the 
Constitution.  This author has found periodic polls regarding the Constitution conducted 
by the Yomiuri going back to 1981 with annual polls beginning in 1993.  Many of the 
questions are identical (with a few exceptions) and thus grant an opportunity to see how 











Figure 1.  Yomiuri Shimbun Public Opinion Poll:  Do you think it is right to revise the 
current Constitution or do you think it is right to not revise it?42 
The data presented in Figure 1 begins in 1981 and ends in 2008.  1981 was the 
first year poll data was found for the Yomiuri on this topic.  By presenting the data all the 
way back to 1981, it is possible to get a better understanding of how Japanese have 
                                                 
42Compiled from the following sources:  1981, 86, 91, 93-96, 98 data from Elizabeth H. Hastings and 
Philip K. Hastings, eds. Index for International Public Opinion (Westport, Connecticut:  Greenwood Press, 
various years); 1997 data from the website of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Japanese Data 
Archive, available at:  http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/jpoll/JPOLL.html (accessed March 22, 2009); 
1999-2000 data from website of the Japan Foundation Library (), available at: 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/340.htm and 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/348.htm  respectively (accessed March 22, 
2009); 2001-2006 data from the Private Sector Constitution Commission () website, available 
at: http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm#sankou (accessed March 22, 2009); 2007 data from the 
website of the Mansfield Foundation, available at:  http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2007/poll-07-7.htm 
(accessed March 22, 2009); 2008 data from the website of the Yomiuri Shimbun, available at:  
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm (accessed March 22, 2009); The author 
did not have access to get the original Japanese text of the 1981, ‘86, ‘91, ‘93, ‘94, ‘95, ‘96, ‘97, ‘98, ‘07 
polls, so it is impossible to see if the wording of the questions and answers were consistent with the other 
years.  Additionally, the questions and answers that are available in Japanese are not worded identically 
throughout the years.  In light of this, the author has taken some liberty to present the data in such a 
continuous fashion.  Despite minor changes in wording, the author feels that data in Figure 1 presents an 
accurate picture of Japanese public opinion regarding Constitutional revision for the given time period.  
Also, the polls were not taken on an annual basis until 1993.  Prior to that, there are only three years that 
had polls:  1981, 1986 and 1991.  To deal with the gaps in data, the graph connects the surrounding points 
with a straight line.  This also occurs for the “Other/No Answer” data in 2000 because this data was not 
found.  Finally, some of the data was reported to one decimal place; however other data was rounded to a 
whole number.  Consequently, all of the data has been rounded to whole numbers.  
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viewed Constitutional revision over the years.  Additionally, it gives more weight to 
recent trends because they can be viewed in a greater context. 
The evidence presented in Figure 1 is very clear.  It is obvious that since 1993, 
those who favor revision have outnumbered those who oppose it by differing margins, 
with 2004 representing the extremes of both sides.  However, an interesting trend is 
visible beginning in 2004 that is of particular relevance to this thesis. 
Since 2004, public support for Constitutional revision has fallen by a staggering 
22.5% while opposition has increased 20.4%.  In fact, 2008 marks the first year since 
1993 that those who oppose revision (43.1%) outnumber those who favor it (42.5%).43  
The Yomiuri claims that the reason for the decline in revision support has to do with 
domestic political issues such as the resignation of Prime Minister Abe (who was a strong 
proponent of Constitutional revision) and the frustration caused by the divided Diet.44 
While this author does not refute the Yomiuri’s claim, he speculates that the 
difficulties encountered during the war in Iraq might also have played a role in the 
decline of support.  It is likely that daily news reports of the problems in Iraq made an 
impression on the Japanese public and may have contributed to their unwillingness to 
support revision for fear that Japan might get pulled into an international conflict by the 
United States. 
It is impossible to predict if the trend in Figure 1 will continue into the future.  
Japan is now on its second prime minister since Abe’s resignation, but the divided Diet 
continues.  Also, the war in Iraq has improved, but things appear to be going poorly in 
Afghanistan.  What effect will these have on future response rates?  It is impossible to 
know. 
It can be said, however, that the data from Figure 1 suggests that Constitutional 
revision is not a popular topic to pursue politically right now.  The numbers of those who 
                                                 
43Yomiuri Shimbun, “Those who oppose Constitutional revision 43%, surpass those who support 
it…Yomiuri Shimbun Public Opinion Poll,” April 8, 2008, website of the Yomiuri Shimbun, available at: 




support revision have begun to dwindle, while opposition has been on the rise.  
Unfortunately, Figure 1 does not give us the entire picture regarding the public’s opinion 
on revision because it does not reveal the reasons for their responses.  Other poll 
questions provide this data. 
 
Figure 2.  Yomiuri Shimbun Public Opinion Poll:  [Of those who answered “It is better to 
revise it” in Figure 1] What is the reason for why you think it is better to revise it?  Please 
select as many you would like from the list:45 
The data presented in Figure 2 begins in 1999.  This date was chosen because it 
becomes difficult to create a coherent timeline much before 1998 as the Yomiuri provided 
                                                 
45 Compiled from the following sources:  1999 and 2000 data from the website of the Japan 
Foundation Library (), available at:  
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/340.htm and 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/348.htm respectively (accessed March 22, 2009); 
2001 through 2006 data from the website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), 
available at:  http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm#sankou (accessed March 22, 2009); 2007 data 
from the website of the Mansfield Foundation, available at:  http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2007/poll-
07-7.htm (accessed March 22, 2009); 2008 data from the website of the Yomiuri Shimbun, available at:  
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm (accessed March 22, 2009); The question 
has been slightly reworded from the original to ensure it makes sense within the context of this thesis.  
Translations for the answers are from the Mansfield Foundation.  Unfortunately, the author did not have 
access to the original Japanese version of the 2007 data, so it is not possible to verify that the questions and 
answers were identical to the other years.  Also, the question presented in 2008 had a minor change in the 
wording from the previous years.  Despite this, the author feels that the data in Figure 4 presents an 
accurate picture of Japanese public opinion regarding the reasons for desiring Constitutional revision for 
the given time period.  Additionally, the author made two minor grammatical corrections to the Mansfield 
translations.  Additionally, there were two more possible responses labeled “Other” and “Do Not Know / 
No Answer”.  They have been omitted to prevent the information presented in the graph from becoming too 
cluttered.   
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different possible answers for its respondents.  It is also an appropriate starting point 
because it focuses the debate on current times and was the first poll taken since North 
Korea’s August 1998 ballistic missile launch over Japan. 
Figure 2 spells out very clearly the many reasons that the Japanese public has for 
wanting to revise its Constitution.  The primary reason for those who support revision is 
because they believe that the current document is unable to deal with new problems that 
have surfaced in the contemporary world.  This author assumes that this reason partially 
deals with Japan’s difficulty in participating in U.N.-sanctioned international security 
actions. 
While the inability to deal with new problems is consistently cited as the number 
one reason by a wide margin, the other responses seem to be all grouped together.  Based 
on the most recent poll, the second reason reflects Japanese dissatisfaction with how the 
original document was influenced by the U.S. occupation.  The third reason shows their 
unhappiness with the confusion caused by the interpretation and application of their 
Constitution.  It can be inferred from this that the public desires a document that clearly 
spells out what Japan can and cannot do. 
While the reasons given in Figure 2 reveals why Japanese want Constitutional 
revision, the reasons not given are also significant to note.  It is worth mentioning that of 
all the reasons cited, the desire to become a nation that can freely use its military is not 
included.  This shows that the desire to remove Japan’s restrictions of the use of military 
force is not even being considered in the general debate on whether or not to revise the 
Constitution. 
Instead, the public’s desire for revision seems to be rooted in other issues of less 
importance to security affairs.  The only reason that deals specifically with security 
would be one that mentions the SDF.  However, this reason merely gives voice to those 





Thus, this reason does not support a renewed interest in remilitarization at all.  Instead, it 
reflects a desire for a further institutionalization of Japan’s defense-oriented security 
policies. 
 
Figure 3.  Yomiuri Shimbun Public Opinion Poll:  [Of those who answered “It is better 
not to revise it” in Figure 1] What is the reason for why you think it is better not to revise 
it?  Please select as many you would like from the list:46 
Figure 3 summarizes the various motivations for those who oppose Constitutional 
revision.  There are several interesting points that can be shown with the data.  First, the 
                                                 
46 Compiled from the following sources:  1999 and 2000 data from the website of the Japan 
Foundation Library (), available at:  
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/340.htm and 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/348.htm respectively (accessed March 22, 2009); 
2001-2006 data from the website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at:  
http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm#sankou (accessed March 22, 2009); 2007 data from the 
website of the Mansfield Foundation, available at:  http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2007/poll-07-7.htm 
(accessed March 22, 2009); 2008 data from the website of the Yomiuri Shimbun, available at:  
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm (accessed March 22, 2009); The question 
has been slightly reworded from the original to ensure it makes sense within the context of this thesis.  
Translations for the answers are from the Mansfield Foundation.  Unfortunately, the author did not have 
access to the original Japanese version of the 2007 data, so it is not possible to verify that the questions and 
answers were identical to the other years.  Also, the question presented in 2008 had a minor change in the 
wording from the previous years.  Despite this, the author feels that the data in Figure 4 presents an 
accurate picture of Japanese public opinion regarding the reasons for not desiring Constitutional revision 
for the given time period.  Additionally, there were two more possible responses labeled “Other” and “Do 
Not Know / No Answer.”  They have been omitted to prevent the information presented in the graph from 
becoming too cluttered. 
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current primary reason reflects the pride that some Japanese feel in the unique, peaceful 
nature of their Constitution.  This reason has trended upwards significantly since 2001 
and has been the number one reason since 2004.  Apparently, there are a growing number 
of Japanese who do not want to revise the Constitution because of the example it 
provides to the rest of the world of what a Constitution can stand for.  
The most significant reason for the purposes of this thesis, however, is the third 
reason.  This reason is a clear example of the strand of thought that firmly opposes 
Constitutional revision due to the fear that it will lead to remilitarization.  This fear 
peaked in 2004 (perhaps in response to Japan’s January 2004 involvement in the 
reconstruction of Iraq) but has since decreased.  However, at 32.4%, it is still a significant 
concern for those who oppose revision. 
There are two conclusions that can be drawn from the Yomiuri Shimbun data 
presented in Figures 1-3.  First, the Japanese population does not support Constitutional 
revision now.  However, the most recent poll numbers show that this is a recent 
occurrence and the margin is slim enough to not be decisive. 
Second, of the reasons given by those who desire revision, none directly reflect 
the desire for Japan to remove its restrictions on the use of military force.  It is possible 
that those who responded “New Issues have arisen in which the current Constitution 
cannot handle” may be referring to a desire for Japan to be able to use military force.  By 
contrast, of those who oppose revision, there is a significant number who openly fear a 
return to remilitarization.  This suggests that even if Constitutional revision did occur, the 
chances that it would result in a removal of Japan’s restrictions on the use of military 
force are slim. 
B. ARTICLE 9 REVISION 
When examining public opinion polls on Constitutional issues, it is easy for 
people to directly link the issue of Constitutional revision with Japan’s attitude towards 
Article 9.  However, the previous section demonstrated its complexity and revealed the 
many different issues involved.  Therefore, it is not sufficient to simply examine what 
percentage of the Japanese public desires to revise the Constitution.  It is also necessary 
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to examine public opinion regarding Article 9 itself to see if they believe it should be 
revised and what that revision would look like.  The purpose of this section will be to 
examine and discuss the polling data specific to Article 9 to determine what this suggests 
for future Japanese security policy. 
 
Figure 4.  Yomiuri Shimbun Public Opinion Poll:  To the present day Japan has acted in 
accordance with interpretation and use of the disputed Article 9 of the Constitution, by 
which war was abandoned and military power was discarded.  Henceforth, what do you 
feel should be done about Article 9?  Please select from the following list one option:47 
This data can be reconstructed beginning in 2002.  Figure 4 reveals that for most of the 
past six years, most Japanese respondents have felt the need to revise Article 9.  However, 
trends since 2004 show a gradual changing of opinion on this topic.  The year 2007 
                                                 
47 Compiled from the following sources:  2002-2006 data from the website of the Private Sector 
Constitution Commission (), available at:  
http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm#sankou (accessed March 22, 2009); 2007 data from the 
website of the Mansfield Foundation, available at:  http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2007/poll-07-7.htm 
(accessed March 22, 2009); 2008 data from the website of the Yomiuri Shimbun, available at:  
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm (accessed March 22, 2009); Translations 
for this question and its corresponding answers are from the Mansfield Foundation. Unfortunately, the 
author did not have access to the original Japanese version of the 2007 data, so it is not possible to verify 
that the questions and answers were identical to the other years.  Also, the question presented in 2008 had a 
minor change in the wording from the previous years.  Despite this, the author feels that the data in Figure 
4 presents an accurate picture of Japanese public opinion regarding Article 9 for the given time period.  
Additionally, the “Other” data for 2007 is listed by Mansfield as 20% which the author believes is a typo.  
This is because Mansfield also lists the “Other” data for 2008 as 30%, which the Yomiuri lists as 0.3%.  
The author believes that the “Other” data for 2007 should be 0.2% which is more consistent. 
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marks when those who prefer the status quo outnumbered those who favored revision.  
This trend has continued through to the most recent polls.  It is interesting that these two 
trends closely match the trends shown in Figure 1.  Thus, support for both Constitutional 
revision and Article 9 revision, has dropped significantly since 2004. 
Additionally, it is also worth noting that the numbers of those who prefer a strict 
interpretation of Article 9 have slowly been increasing.  In fact, if one adds up those who 
favor strict interpretation with the percentage of those who prefer the status quo, a total of 
60.1% of the Japanese public does not want to revise Article 9.  This is an almost 2 to 1 
advantage over those who do want to revise Article 9.  The implication of this is that any 
substantive change to Article 9 does not appear to be imminent. 
As explained in Chapter I, Article 9 is composed of two paragraphs that each 
address different issues.  Paragraph one states Japan’s renunciation of war and Paragraph 
two states Japan’s refusal to maintain land, sea, and air forces and other war potential as 
well as their refusal to recognize the right of the belligerency of the state.  Recent polls 
have examined Japanese attitudes about each of these paragraphs. 
 
Figure 5.  2008 Yomiuri Shimbun Public Opinion Poll:  Regarding paragraph one which 
established the “renunciation of war”, do you think there is a need to revise it or not?48 
                                                 
48Yomiuri Shimbun, “Yearly Survey:  Japanese Person (4) Constitution,” March 15-16, 2008, Question 
21, S1, website of the Yomiuri Shimbun, available at:  
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm (accessed March 22, 2009). 
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Figure 5 is very clear.  In 2008, a vast majority of Japanese did not support any 
changes to Japan’s renunciation of war.  This is strong evidence that there is no public 
support for Japan to remilitarize in a way that allows the use of force in security policy. 
 
Figure 6.  2008 Yomiuri Shimbun Public Opinion Poll:  What about paragraph two which 
established “Not being able to maintain war potential” among other things?49 
As Figure 6 shows, the opinions regarding paragraph two are not as definitive as 
for paragraph one.  The poll data does not delve into the reasons for the responses, but 
this author feels that the results presented in Figure 2 suggests that those who do want to 
revise paragraph two may be interested in legitimizing the SDF.  For more information 
on this, it is possible to look at other polls conducted by different organizations. 
                                                 
49 Yomiuri Shimbun, “Yearly Survey:  Japanese Person (4) Constitution,” March 15-16, 2008, 
Question 21, S2, website of the Yomiuri Shimbun, available at:  
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm (accessed March 22, 2009). 
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Figure 7.  Asahi Shimbun Public Opinion Poll:  Do you think that Article 9 of the 
Constitution should be changed, or do you think that it should not be changed?50 
Figure 7 presents Japanese public opinion regarding Article 9 in a more stark light.  
Instead of asking respondents about how Article 9 should be addressed, it simply asks 
whether or not the article needs to be revised.  It is interesting to note that the results of 
the Asahi poll are similar to the results of the Yomiuri poll presented in Figure 4.  In both 
polls, the numbers of people who do not want Article 9 to be revised have increased in 
recent years. 
The Asahi poll also queried its respondents as to why they answered the way they 
did.  These questions have not been consistently asked in all of the polls, but an 
                                                 
50Compiled from the following sources:  2001, 2004, and 2005 data from the website of the Private 
Sector Constitution Commission (), available at:  :  
http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm#sankou (accessed March 22, 2009); 2007 data from the 
website of the Mansfield Foundation, available at:  http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2007/poll-07-12.htm 
(accessed March 22, 2009); 2008 data from the website of the Asahi, available at:  
http://www.asahi.com/special/08003/TKY200805020272.html (accessed March 22, 2009). The translation 
for this question and its corresponding answers are from the Mansfield Foundation.  The author has made 
one minor grammatical correction to the Mansfield translations.  Also, a different question regarding this 
issue was asked in 2006 so it is not possible to plot a point for that year.  Also, there is no data for 2002 and 
2003.  The information presented in this graph simply draws a line between surrounding points when do 
data is available.  Also, this author has omitted the data for those who responded “No Answer/Other” 
because consistent data was not available for the entire span of time.  It also appears that the wording of the 
question was changed slightly over the years.  The author has taken some liberty to present the data in this 
consistent matter.  It is believed that Figure 7 is an accurate representation of Japanese public opinion on 
this matter. 
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examination of the results from a single year is still valuable because it offers insight into 
how the Japanese public views this particular issue. 
 
Figure 8.  2004 Asahi Shimbun Public Opinion Poll:  [Of those who said “Should be 
changed” in Figure 7] How should it be revised? (Please select one answer)51 
The data from Figure 8 is from the 2004 Asahi Shimbun poll.  It is the most recent 
poll data from Asahi that directly addresses this question.  The author acknowledges that 
it is five-year-old data, but stresses that the results are still relatively timely and offer a 
glimpse into how the public thinks. 
The data reveals that a staggering 93.4% (adding the percentages from the top 
three responses) of respondents cite reasons that have nothing to do with a desire for 
Japan to be able to use unrestricted military force.  The primary reason given relates to 
the desire to spell out the ability of the SDF to make an international contribution.  This 
author assumes that the international contribution would be non-combat related.  
                                                 
51Asahi Shimbun, May 1, 2004, Question 10, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission 
(), available at:  http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm (accessed March 22, 2009).  The 
question has been slightly reworded from the original to ensure it makes sense within the context of this 
thesis.  Also, the percentages presented in this paper have been adjusted to a 100% scale.  The original 
percentages added up to 31% which corresponds to the percentage of those who supported Article 9 
revision in 2004.  Also, Figure 8 has omitted the “Don’t Know / No Answer” response which the website 
claims 0% answered. 
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Regarding reason #3, the author assumes that the idea of defining the SDF as an 
army does not mean removing the restrictions that currently exist on the SDF.  This is 
assumed because the poll goes on to show that a small minority (6.4%) of respondents 
cited their desire to have a military force that can be used overseas.  The Asahi poll also 
queried the reasons for those who do not desire revision of Article 9. 
 
Figure 9.  2004 Asahi Shimbun Public Opinion Poll:  [Of those who said “Should not be 
changed” in Figure 7] Why? (Please select one answer)52 
The data presented in Figure 9 shows that a large majority of respondents believe 
Article 9 should be kept as it is because it affects the peace of Japan and is a document to 
take pride in for its ideals. 
Public opinion regarding Article 9 is clear.  None of the data presented in this 
section suggests that the Japanese public supports a revision to Article 9 that result in the 
removal of its restrictions on the use of military force.  Instead, the data suggests that 
there is strong support among the Japanese public for a continuation of pacifist policies. 
                                                 
52 Asahi Shimbun, May 1, 2004, Question 11, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission 
(), available at:  http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm (accessed March 22, 2009).  The 
question has been slightly reworded from the original to ensure it makes sense within the context of this 
thesis.  The percentages presented in this paper have been adjusted to a 100% scale.  The original 
percentages added up to 60% which corresponds to the percentage of those who opposed Article 9 revision 
in 2004. 
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C. COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 
Another important issue to understand regarding Japan’s future security policy 
has to do with CSD.  This section will examine public opinion polls to determine how the 
Japanese public feels about the issue of CSD.  As mentioned in Chapter I, public opinion 
does not play a direct role in whether or not the Government of Japan will decide to 
change its interpretation regarding the exercise of the right to CSD.  However, strong 
public opinion on this matter may have an influence on politicians. 
 
Figure 10.  Yomiuri Shimbun Public Opinion Poll:  The “right to collective defense” is the 
privilege to counterattack an enemy that attacks a country neighboring Japan, when that 
attack could threaten the safety of Japan.  In the opinion of the government, Japan 
possesses that privilege as well, but upon interpreting the Constitution, it was made so 
that they cannot use it.  From the following list, please choose the option most resembling 
your opinion concerning the right to collective defense:53 
                                                 
53 Compiled from the following sources:  2002-2006 data from the website of the Private Sector 
Constitution Commission (), available at:  
http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm#sankou (March 22, 2009); 2007 data from the website of the 
Mansfield Foundation, available at:  http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2007/poll-07-7.htm (accessed 
March 22, 2009); 2008 data from website of the Yomiuri Shimbun, available at:  
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm (accessed March 22, 2009); The 
translation for this question and its corresponding answers are from the Mansfield Foundation.  
Unfortunately, the author did not have access to the original Japanese version of the 2007 data, so it is not 
possible to verify that the questions and answers were identical to the other years.  Also, the question 
presented in 2008 had a minor change in the wording from the previous years.  Despite this, the author feels 
that the data in Figure 4 presents an accurate picture of Japanese public opinion regarding CSD for the 
given time period.  Additionally, the data prior to 2006 did not differentiate between exercise of CSD via 
revision or interpretation.  This differentiation begins in 2006 and continues through 2008.  To get a 
consistent graph, this author has combined the responses for the years after 2006 into a single variable 
called “Use either revision or interpretation to allow CSD”.  Thus, for 2006-2008, the percentages of those 
who favored CSD via revision were added to those who favored CSD via Constitutional interpretation.  
Additionally, the response that this author translated as “Can’t say either way” was discontinued after 2005.  
Perhaps this explains the large jump in the percentage of those who favored CSD in 2006. 
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The results of the poll given in Figure 10 clearly show the trends of Japanese 
thinking regarding the issue of CSD.  Recent trends show that those who oppose CSD 
have been steadily increasing since 2005 and those who support CSD have been 
decreasing.  This evidence suggests that a public mandate does not exist for Japan to 
change its interpretation regarding CSD.  The same trends are also evident in a similar 
Asahi Shimbun poll done between 2004 and 2006. 
 
Figure 11.  Asahi Shimbun Public Opinion Poll:  Concerning the U.S.-Japan alliance, the 
right of CSD has become a problem.   This refers to the right to view an attack on another 
country as an attack on one’s own country and to then join that country and fight 
alongside it.  The government interprets that Japan has this right, but because of Article 9 
of the Constitution cannot use it.  How do you think regarding the right of CSD? (Please 
choose one from the answer card)54 
                                                 
54 Compiled from the website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available 
at:  http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm#sankou (accessed March 22, 2009).  For those who 
favored the use of CSD, the 2006 poll question did not allow respondents to differentiate between use of 
CSD via revision or interpretation.  This is a change from the 2004 and 2005 question which did allow this 
differentiation.  For the sake of continuity, this author has combined these responses into a single variable 
called “Make it so that we can exercise the right.”  Thus, for each of the years 2004 and 2005, the variable 
“Make it so that we can exercise the right” represents the addition of those who favored CSD through 
interpretation and those who favored it through revision.  Additionally, the question was not worded 
consistently throughout the years.  The author has taken some liberty to present the data in this consistent 
manner, but believes that the information presented is an accurate representation of Japanese public opinion 
on this matter. 
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The results of the Asahi poll are somewhat similar to the Yomiuri data discussed 
in Figure 10.  In both polls, the recent trends have shown support for CSD declining, 
while the numbers of those who do not believe that Japan should engage in CSD have 
been on the increase.  Thus, the evidence from both the Yomiuri and Asahi polls suggest 
that a political mandate does not exist for a change in the Japanese government’s CSD 
policy.  However, it is questionable whether or not these results would be strong enough 
to influence the decisions of Japanese politicians. 
D. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
Unfortunately, there is very little polling data that deals specifically with the issue 
of BMD.  However, it is still possible to gain an understanding of public opinion on this 
issue.  In addition to the one question that directly addresses BMD, it is also possible to 
examine the responses to SDF poll questions to infer how the public feels about the BMD 
program. 
The Cabinet Secretariat Government Information Office (CSGIO) in Japan 
conducted a public opinion poll regarding the SDF and various defense related problems 
every three years.  It is a useful source of information to determine public attitudes 
regarding aspects of the SDF as well as broader questions of what Japan’s role should be 
internationally.  The following polls will provide some understanding regarding how the 
Japanese view the SDF but, more importantly, they will offer some insight into how the 






Figure 12.  CSGIO Public Opinion Poll:  What do you think about the defense capability 
of the SDF?55 
The results presented in Figure 12 covers 1994 to 2006, which is a different time 
line than presented in the Constitutional issues section.  If the 1998 North Korean missile 
launch was used as the starting point for this poll, there would be only three data points 
for analysis.  Thus, the author has chosen to begin in 1994 because it provides a longer 
trend line for analysis.  
Examining Figure 12, it is significant to note that Japanese attitudes towards the 
SDF have hardly changed.  Those who favor the status quo hold a strong majority by a 
very wide margin.  The trend line for the status quo has only waivered by about five 
percentage points over the years.  These results suggest that the public does not want any 
significant changes to the SDF. 
 
                                                 
55 Cabinet Office of Japan, “Public Opinion Poll Related to the SDF and the Defense Problem,” 
February 2006, Section 3, Question #1, website of the Cabinet Office of Japan, available at:  
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-bouei/index.html (accessed March 22, 2009).  The original question 
on the poll was simply worded, “The defense capability of the SDF.”  For the sake of better understanding, 
this author has rewritten out what he believes is the implied question. 
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Figure 13.  2006 CSGIO Public Opinion Poll:  Why does the SDF exist?  (Multiple 
answers allowed).56 
Figure 13 presents the many opinions regarding what the Japanese view as the 
purpose of the SDF.  Examining the data, there are several conclusions that can be drawn.  
First, the Japanese currently believe that the SDF primarily exists for disaster relief-type 
operations.  This is a very different conception that other countries may have about their 
“military” forces. 
Second, the idea that the SDF exists to protect Japan from ballistic missile attacks 
is quite low on the list.  This is especially puzzling considering the very real threat North 
                                                 
56Cabinet Office of Japan, “Public Opinion Poll Related to the SDF and the Defense Problem,” 
February 2006, Section 4, Question #1, Sub question , website of the Cabinet Office of Japan, available 
at:  http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-bouei/index.html (accessed March 22, 2009).  The original 
question on the poll was simply worded, “The purpose for the existence of the SDF.”  For the sake of better 
understanding, this author has rewritten it in the form of a question.  There were also two more possible 
responses (“Other” and “I don’t know”) which have been omitted for the sake of a simpler graph.  
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Korea poses to the Japanese population.  Yet, a vast majority of the public does not think 
that it is one of the top responsibilities of the SDF.  The author believes that this data 
reveals the relatively low importance the public attaches to the issue of BMD.  This is 
interesting given the support of the public for BMD as well as the amount of concern the 
public apparently has towards the Korean peninsula (this will be discussed in Figure 15).  
Before examining the Japanese public’s security concerns, their attitude about BMD will 
be presented. 
 
Figure 14.  2006 CSGIO Public Opinion Poll:  What do you think about the completion 
of a BMD system?57 
Of all the polls examined, this is the only question that deals directly with the 
public’s opinion of the Japanese BMD system.  It shows that 56.6% of the public 
supports the idea of a BMD system, while 25.1% opposes it.  This shows over a 2 to 1  
 
 
                                                 
57 Cabinet Office of Japan, “Public Opinion Poll Related to the SDF and the Defense Problem,” 
February 2006, Section 4, Question 7, website of the Cabinet Office of Japan, available at:  
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-bouei/index.html (accessed March 22, 2009).  The original question 
can be translated as “For or Against the Completion of a BMD System.”  For the sake of readability, this 
author has taken the liberty of wording it to ask the implied question. 
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margin of support.  This data, along with the results from Figure 15 (discussed below), 
suggest that the Japanese public strongly supports the creation of a BMD program 
because of the threat from North Korea. 
 
Figure 15.  2006 CSGIO Public Opinion Poll:  What topics are you interested in from the 
point of view of Japan’s peace and security?  (Multiple answers allowed)58 
Figure 15 reveals the top six security concerns of the Japanese public in 2006.  It 
is important to note that the #1 and #4 concerns can be seen to relate to the threat from 
North Korea.  The relatively low ranking of the SDF’s BMD mission (shown in Figure 
13) is puzzling when compared with this data.  It would seem logical that such a strong 
concern among the public would translate into a greater role for the SDF to deal with 
BMD.  This suggests that the public does not view BMD as an important role for the SDF 
and that the public does not want the acceptance of a BMD program to result in a drastic 
change to Japan’s security policies. 
                                                 
58 Cabinet Office of Japan, “Public Opinion Poll Related to the SDF and the Defense Problem,” 
February 2006, Section 6, Question 5, website of the Cabinet Office of Japan, available at:  
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-bouei/index.html (accessed March 22, 2009).  The original question 
provided 13 possible responses.  For the purposes of legibility, Figure 15 only includes the top 6 responses. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine public opinion polls to determine if 
the public supports the removal of Japan’s restrictions on the use of military force.  The 
evidence presented strongly suggests that there is little support among the public for this 
change and that there is no public mandate for a fundamental change in Japan’s security 
policy.  There are also some important conclusions that can be drawn from the data that 
are relevant to this thesis. 
First, the Japanese public does not support the idea of a Constitutional revision.  
Despite support in the past, recent trends show a loss of support while those who oppose 
revision have increased.  Even if Constitutional revision were to occur, it is apparent that 
a majority of those who favor a revision are seeking changes that will have little or no 
effect on Japan’s security policies. 
Second, the public does not desire a revision of Article 9 that will result in a 
removal of Japan’s restrictions.  If a revision of Article 9 were to occur, it would not lead 
to a drastic change in Japan’s security policy.  Instead, it would likely legally recognize 
the SDF as well as institutionalize the ability of the SDF to participate in international 
activities that have nothing to do with Japan’s ability to participate in combat operations. 
Third, the issue of CSD is not resonating with the public.  Despite mild support in 
the past, recent trends reveal that the public does not support a change in Japan’s position 
regarding the exercise of this right.  This suggests that there is little popular support for a 
change in Japan’s interpretation of the right to exercise CSD.  It is difficult to tell whether 
public opposition to CSD is strong enough to influence the opinions of politicians who 
are the ultimate deciders on this issue. 
Finally, the public does not expect the new BMD program to represent a new 
direction for Japan’s security policy.  They acknowledge and understand the need for 
BMD, but still assign it as a low priority for the SDF.  This is particularly interesting 
given the high attention that the situation on the Korean Peninsula receives among the 
public.  This suggests that BMD is not viewed as a step towards a more aggressive 
national security policy. 
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III. THE OPINIONS OF POLITICIANS 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the opinions of politicians within Japan 
to determine if they support a removal of Japan’s restrictions on the military use of force.  
Similar to the frequent public opinion polls, Japanese news organizations and universities 
periodically conduct surveys of current politicians to understand their stands on various 
issues.  Obviously, the issues of Constitutional revision, Article 9, and CSD are 
frequently covered. 
This author was unable to find any survey data that directly dealt with the issue of 
BMD.  However, it is possible to examine questions related to the SDF to infer how 
Japanese politicians think about BMD.  Additionally, all of the surveys examined take 
place after the December 2003 decision by the government of Japan to introduce BMD, 
so lawmakers were aware of the issue and must have considered its implications as they 
responded to all the questions.  The surveys examined are organized topically in the same 
sequence as the Chapter II. 
Unfortunately, the surveys were not systematically applied on a consistent, annual 
basis.  Instead, the various data available focuses on different target groups with slightly 
differently worded questions and at inconsistent intervals.  This prevents the creation of a 
time-series graph that allows us to chart Diet member opinions as they change over time.  
However, valuable insight can still be gained by examining the evidence that does exist. 
The Japanese Diet is composed of two houses, the Lower House, called the House 
of Representatives, and the Upper House called the House of Councillors.  The surveys 
examined within this chapter target both houses of the Diet together, as well as each 
house individually.  A few things must be kept in mind as the data is discussed and 
evaluated. 
First, the Lower House surveys are significant because within the Japanese 
bicameral political system, the Lower House is the more powerful of the two houses.  
This is due to its ability to override Upper House decisions by a two-thirds majority after 
60 days.  The Lower House is currently controlled by the LDP along with its coalition 
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partner, Komeito (Clean Government Party), which is much smaller.  The last Lower 
House election occurred in 2005 and was a strong victory for the LDP.  Thus, the results 
of the 2005 Lower House survey are strongly influenced by LDP opinion.  Unfortunately, 
this survey was taken four years ago and it is possible that opinions have since changed. 
Second, the Upper House is currently controlled by the DPJ, which won a 
landslide victory in 2007.  Thus, the 2007 Upper House surveys reveal the influence of 
DPJ lawmakers.  Although the Upper House is the weaker of the two houses, the Upper 
House survey is significant because it reflects the latest data available on politician 
opinions. 
Third, survey data from both houses are included to show the collective opinions 
of Japanese lawmakers on the issues of interest.  This data is from 2004 and is a little 
dated.  However, it offers the best insight into the opinion of the entire Diet and thus is 
valuable. 
Finally, before the data is presented it is necessary to discuss counter-arguments 
regarding the importance of this data.  Some may question why politician surveys are 
relevant to Japan’s future security policy, while others may wonder how the veracity of 
the responses may be verified.  These are good questions that deserve attention. 
Much like its argument for public opinion polls, this thesis does not argue that the 
results of these politician surveys are a definitive driver of where Japan’s security policy 
is headed.  Policy is not created by individuals, but rather by groups of politicians 
working together in political parties that frequently involves mutual compromise.  
However, the survey data presented in this chapter is relevant because it reveals the 
general attitudes and opinions of individual Japanese politicians before they begin to 
work together to form government policies.  Therefore, the opinions expressed in these 
surveys are the building blocks upon which those policies will be built and suggest how 
the policies will be formulated and what kinds of compromises may be made.  This 
makes their results worth considering. 
Secondly, regarding the veracity of the data, it must be acknowledged that no 
survey or poll can guarantee that the respondents have been honest.  However, it appears 
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that the results of the surveys were presented anonymously so there is no reason why a 
politician would not want to answer honestly.  The Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo 
data does link actual names to responses, but it is not readily accessible.  Additionally, 
Japanese politicians are frequently asked to fill out surveys and there is nothing that 
compels them to respond.59  This author actually found one survey in which a very small 
percentage of politicians actually answered.  The significance of this is that Japanese 
politicians probably did not lie on these surveys.  If they did not want to reveal their true 
opinions, it would be much more probable that they would simply decline to answer the 
question. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 
 
Figure 16.  2005 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Survey of the Lower House:  Do 
you think the Constitution needs to be revised?  Please select only one.60 
 
                                                 
59 Robert Weiner, personal communications, March 2009. 
60 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2005 Lower House Election 
Candidate Survey”, August 8, 2005, Question 8, Sub question 1, data is offered at the website of the 
University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, 
available at:  http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html (accessed March 22, 2009).  Codebook 
for interpreting the data is available from Japan Political Research () 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), 
p. 288.  This graph was created by sorting the data to only include responses from winners of the 2005 
election.  Based on this, the survey covers 79.8% of the winners in 2005. 
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Figure 16 shows the results of a 2005 survey given to members of the Lower 
House who were asked to give their opinions regarding the issue of Constitutional 
revision.  Those who favored revision made up 84.8% while those who opposes were 
only 8.6%.  Comparing this data to public opinion data from the same period shows that 
Lower House Diet Members were much more in favor of Constitutional revision than the 
public.  The Yomiuri public opinion poll data showed 60.6% in favor and 26.6% opposed 
(see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 also showed a noticeable decline in the public’s support rate for 
Constitutional revision beginning in 2004.  Without consistent survey data, it is 
impossible to determine if the opinion of politicians followed the same trend.  The most 
recent survey, however, was done in 2007 and targeted Upper House Diet Members.  It is 
possible to examine their response on this question to determine if there has been a 
decline in the support rate.  The author acknowledges that the surveys gauged the 
responses of different target populations, but contends that the results are still worth 
considering. 
 
Figure 17.  2007 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House:  Do 
you think the Constitution needs to be revised?  Please select one.61 
                                                 
61 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members 
and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 3, Sub question 1, data is 
offered at the website of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate 
Schools for Law and Politics, available at:  http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html (accessed 
March 22, 2009).  Codebook for interpreting the data is available from Japan Political Research 
() 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), p. 279.  This author sorted the data from the 2007 Asahi 
Shimbun/University of Tokyo surveys to only include responses from incumbent members of the Upper 
House and the winners of the 2007 election.  Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current 
members of the Upper House. 
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Figure 17 reveals that the data from a 2007 Upper House survey does show a 
marked decline in the support rate for Constitutional revision among respondents.  Only 
52.5% of respondents in the Upper House support revision, which is a 32.3% drop.  
Conversely, the ranks of those who oppose revision now stand at 27.5%, which is an 
increase of 18.9%. 
Using these numbers as a guide, it is obvious that the data shows similar trends in 
survey data of politicians as well as public opinion data.  Despite their declining numbers, 
it is also revealing to examine the reasons respondents gave for their support of 
Constitutional revision.  The data here shows another similar correlation with public 
opinion data.  Results from both houses will be presented, beginning with the Upper 
House. 
 
Figure 18.  2007 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House:  We 
will now ask a question to those who answered, “It should be revised” and “If I had to 
say, it should be revised” [see Figure 17].  Why do you answer this way?  Please select 
only one.62 
                                                 
62 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members 
and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 3, Sub question 2, data is 
offered at the website of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate 
Schools for Law and Politics, available at:  http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html (accessed 
March 22, 2009).  Codebook for interpreting the data is available from Japan Political Research 
() 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), p. 278.  This author sorted the data from the 2007 Asahi 
Shimbun/University of Tokyo surveys to only include responses from incumbent members of the Upper 
House and the winners of the 2007 election.  Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current 
members of the Upper House.  Figure 17 had 105 individuals answer “It should be revised” and “If I had to 
say, it should be revised.”  However, the data for Figure 18 only showed 95 answers.  Thus, this author 
took the liberty of putting those ten individuals in the “No Answer” column. 
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It is significant to note that Figure 18 shows the top reason for desiring 
Constitutional revision has nothing directly to do with security issues, although it is 
possible that some who gave this reply were referring to a desire for Japan to be able to 
exercise the right of collective security or collective self-defense.  Despite this possibility, 
this author assumes that security issues do not play a major role in reason #1.  It is also 
interesting that the issue of Article 9 comes in fourth place at 7.6% while this reason was 
not mentioned in the public opinion poll (see Figure 2).  The response on Article 9 is also 
worded in such a way that it is a little unclear exactly what is being said.  The 2005 Asahi 
Shimbun/University of Tokyo survey did not ask this question of its respondents, but a 
2005 survey of Lower House members done by the Yomiuri Shimbun did. 
 
Figure 19.  2005 Yomiuri Shimbun Survey of Diet Members from the Lower House:  
What are some concrete contents for a revised Constitution?63 
                                                 
63 Yomiuri Shimbun, September 13, 2005, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission 
(), available at:  http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/sinbun/yoron/kokkai1709.htm (accessed 
March 22, 2009).  Survey targeted winners of the 2005 Lower House Elections.  The website does not 
mention how many responses were allowed, but it is obvious that respondents were allowed to choose more 
than one answer.  The original question was quite short so it has not been translated verbatim.  Instead, it 
was worded to better convey the question.  The answers are similarly short, but they have been translated 
verbatim.   Additionally, the website does not list the source as the Yomiuri, but lists it as “” 
which does not exist.  However, elsewhere on the website the Yomiuri is clearly identified as the source 
despite being listed as “.”  Therefore, this author assumes this is a Yomiuri survey. 
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Figure 19 asks Lower House Diet members how they want to see the Constitution 
revised.  Much like the Upper House data presented in Figure 18, it is obvious that the 
issue of Constitutional revision encompasses many issues. What is interesting to note is 
that the Lower House’s two primary reasons have to do with spelling out Japan’s right to 
maintain self-defense ability and participate in international cooperation.64  The next 
three reasons all deal with issues that do not relate to security matters.  This reveals that 
the Lower House is more concerned with security issues than the Upper House.  
Regardless of this difference, however, the data presented in Figures 18 and 19 reveal 
very few in the Diet desire Constitutional revision for the purpose of remilitarizing in 
some way. 
Interestingly, public opinion data showed a slightly different result.  Figure 2 
revealed that the most recent 2008 data shows the number one reason the public desired 
revision had to do with the Constitution’s inability to handle new problems.  As discussed 
above, this answer could include desires for Japan to participate in international activities 
which would deal with security issues.  This shows that Lower House opinion regarding 
revision is much more in line with public opinion.  However, despite the slight 
discrepancy between public and politician opinion regarding the reasons for 
Constitutional revision, the data shows that a desire to revise Japan’s Constitution in a 
way that would involve remilitarization is apparently not part of the agenda in either the 






                                                 
64 This author makes the assumption that reason #2 is discussing non-combat-related activities done on 
the international stage. 
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Figure 20.  2007 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House:  We 
will now ask a question of those who answered, “If I had to say, it shouldn’t be revised” 
and “It shouldn’t be revised” [see Figure 17].  Why did you answer this way?  Please 
select only one.65 
Figure 20 reveals the reasons given by Upper House members regarding why they 
oppose Constitutional revision.  The data shows a vast majority of respondents are 
worried about what Constitutional revision may mean in terms of Article 9.  This 
percentage is higher than the most recent public opinion polls which showed 27.3% of  
 
 
                                                 
65 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members 
and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 3, Sub question 4, data is 
offered at the website of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate 
Schools for Law and Politics, available at:  http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html (accessed 
March 22, 2009).  Codebook for interpreting the data is available from Japan Political Research 
() 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), p. 277.  This author sorted the data from the 2007 Asahi 
Shimbun/University of Tokyo surveys to only include responses from incumbent members of the Upper 
House and the winners of the 2007 election.  Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current 
members of the Upper House.  The original question mentions that this question targets those who 
answered negatively to sub question 1.  The author omitted that part of the question from the translation 
and directs readers to Figure 17 for the results of sub question 1. 
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respondents were concerned about the effects of Constitutional revision on Article 9 (see 
Figure 3 above).  This suggests the Diet members are much more protective of Article 9 
that the public. 
 
Figure 21.  2005 Yomiuri Shimbun Survey of Diet Members from the Lower House: 
What do you think about Constitutional revision?66 
In 2005, the Yomiuri conducted a poll of Lower House Diet members that shows 
similar data to the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo survey presented in Figure 16.  
Although this information has already been covered, this survey data is significant 
because it provides more detailed information regarding how each political party 
responded.  There are two important points that can be concluded from this data. 
                                                 
66 Yomiuri Shimbun, September 13, 2005, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission 
(), available at:  http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/sinbun/yoron/kokkai1709.htm (accessed 
March 22, 2009).  Survey targeted winners of the 2005 Lower House Elections.  The website does not print 
a specific question, but a question is strongly implied.  This author has taken the liberty of composing what 
he believes the implied question is.  Additionally, the website does not list the source as the Yomiuri, but 
lists it as “”.  See the footnote associated with Figure 19 for an explanation on why this author 
lists it from the Yomiuri.  Finally, the reader will notice that the graph does not present a percentage for 
some responses from various parties.  The website simply shows a dash (-) for these answers.  The context 
does not lead this author to believe those dashes represent 0%, but there is no explanation for what it means.  
Consequently, this author has simply left them out of Figure 21. 
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First, it is obvious that there is a strong divide between the two major parties 
(LDP and DPJ) on the one hand and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Japan 
Communist Party (JCP) on the other.  Both the JCP and JSP are relatively small political 
parties and have 100% (in the case of the JCP) and 86% (in the case of the JSP) of their 
Diet members voting against Constitutional revision.  Unfortunately, this graph does not 
present the relative number of individuals represented by each party.  A sense of how 
small the JSP and JCP are can be seen in the incredibly small percentage (6%) they make 
up in the overall data despite the large numbers within their party who oppose revision. 
Second, there is strong support for revision within the LDP and its coalition 
partner, Komeito.  Conversely, the DPJ shows less support as well as more members are 
undecided regarding the issue.  This disparity between the LDP and DPJ is important in 
light of their probable win in the upcoming 2009 Lower House election.  If this occurs, 
the party with the strongest support for revision, the LDP, will lose power. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this section is that politicians support 
Constitutional revision, despite a recent decline in their numbers.  However, the data also 
suggests that if Constitutional revision were to occur, it would likely not result in a 
fundamental change to Japan’s security policy.  Article 9 will now be examined. 
B. ARTICLE 9 REVISION 
The survey data presented so far has revealed the general thoughts of politicians 
regarding Constitutional revision.  This next section will explicitly deal with the issue of 
Article 9 revision.  This evidence will further support the conclusions that have been 




Figure 22.  2007 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House:  Do 
you think Article 9 should be changed?67 
The data presented here is the most recent survey data regarding the issue of 
Article 9.  It is obvious from the results that opposition to revision of Article 9 is strong 
within the Upper House of the Diet.  Unfortunately, the most recent Lower House data 
regarding this issue comes from 2004. 
 
                                                 
67 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members 
and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 4, data is offered at the website 
of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and 
Politics, available at:  http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html (accessed March 22, 2009).  
Codebook for interpreting the data is available from Japan Political Research () 5, No. 1/2, 
(January 2008), p. 277.  This author sorted the data from the 2007 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo 
surveys to only include responses from incumbent members of the Upper House and the winners of the 
2007 election.  Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current members of the Upper House. 
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Figure 23.  2004 Yomiuri Shimbun Survey of Diet Members from the Lower House:  In 
particular, how do you feel about Article 9?68 
The data presented in Figure 23 is from 2004 and reveals a strong majority within 
the Lower House want to revise Article 9.  It is not possible to determine if this opinion 
has changed in the intervening years.  Also, it is unfortunate that this survey does not 
delve further into the reasons for the Lower House members’ responses.  In light of these 
two problems, it is difficult to include the results of Figure 23 into our understanding of 
politician opinions.  However, other survey data may help to give further insight. 
A Mainichi Shimbun survey conducted around the same time offers some more 
information regarding this issue.  The survey focused on members of both houses and 
asked for specific opinions regarding each paragraph of Article 9. 
 
                                                 
68 Yomiuri Shimbun, March 17, 2004, Question #2, website of the Private Sector Constitution 
Commission (), available at:  http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm (accessed March 
22, 2009).  Survey targeted members of the Lower House.  There is a type on the website regarding the date 
of this data.  The left hand column labels it as March 16, 2004, but when you examine the actual data it is 
dated March 17, 2004. 
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Figure 24.  2004 Mainichi Shimbun Survey of Diet Members from Both Houses:  Is there 
a need to revise Paragraph one (war renunciation) of Article 9 in the Constitution?69 
The results of this question show an interesting three-way split among 
respondents.  Clearly, there is no majority within the Diet that believes in removing the 
renunciation of war.  The survey goes on to provide some more information regarding 
party affiliation.  Of those who said “no,” 55% were from the LDP, 74% were from the 
DPJ, and 94% were from Komeito.70 
 
                                                 
69Mainichi Shimbun, May 3, 2004, Question #5, website of the Private Sector Constitution 
Commission (), available at:  http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm (accessed March 
22, 2009).  According to the website, the survey was given to all Diet members except winners of the April 
25, 2004 Lower House by-elections and members missing from the Upper House. 
70  Mainichi Shimbun, May 3, 2004, Question #5, website of the Private Sector Constitution 
Commission (), available at:  http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm (accessed March 
22, 2009).  The website does not indicate how the individual parties answered for the other responses.  This 
author believes that the Private Sector constitution Commission simply chose not to report that information. 
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Figure 25.  2004 Mainichi Shimbun Survey of Diet Members from Both Houses:  Is there 
a need to revise Paragraph two (no maintenance of war potential) of Article 9 in the 
Constitution?71 
A clear trend is visible when the question focuses on paragraph two.  Clearly, a 
strong majority exists within the Diet that wants to clarify Japan’s right to maintain war 
potential.  The author assumes that this refers to clarifying Japan’s right to maintain those 
forces for the purpose of self-defense. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence presented in Figures 23 
through 25 is that in 2004, a majority from both houses of the Diet desired revision of 
Article 9.  This revision did not involve a removal of the restrictions on the use of 
military force because no clear majority desired a change to paragraph one of Article 9.  
Instead, the support for revision of Article 9 was based on the desire to change paragraph 
two so that it can make Japan’s right to maintenance of land, sea, and air forces and other 
war potential for the purposes of self-defense clear. 
                                                 
71 Mainichi Shimbun, May 3, 2004, Question #7, website of the Private Sector Constitution 
Commission (), available at:  http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm (accessed March 
22, 2009).  According to the website, the survey was given to all Diet members except winners of the April 
25, 2004 Lower House by-elections and members missing from the Upper House. 
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Interestingly, the most recent survey data presented in Figure 22 reveals that even 
this desire for revision has subsided in recent years (at least within the Upper House).  
This suggests that politicians do not currently support revision of Article 9. 
C. COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 
 
Figure 26.  2005 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Survey of the Lower House:  The 
government should change the Constitutional interpretation so we can exercise the right 
of CSD.72 
Figure 26 reveals that opinions on the issue of CSD are fairly close within the 
Lower House.  While 33.1% supports changing the Constitutional interpretation, 38.9% 
oppose it, with 25.3% undecided.  Comparing this data to the Yomiuri Public Opinion 
poll presented in Figure 10 reveals similar results.  In 2005, the public was also relatively 
evenly split over the issue.  However, beginning in 2006, the Yomiuri public opinion data 
                                                 
72 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2005 Lower House Election 
Candidate Survey”, August 8, 2005, Question 9, Sub question 6, data is offered at the website of the 
University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, 
available at:  http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html (accessed March 22, 2009).  Codebook 
for interpreting the data is available from Japan Political Research () 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), 
p. 286.  This graph was created by sorting the data to only include responses from winners of the 2005 
election.  Based on this, the survey covers 79.8% of the winners in 2005.   
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showed support for CSD decreasing while the numbers of those who oppose its use have 
increased.  It is impossible to determine if opinions within the Lower House have 
followed a similar trend because more recent survey data does not exist.  However, it is 
possible to examine Upper House survey data from 2007. 
 
Figure 27.  2007 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House:  Japan 
should exercise the right of CSD.73 
While acknowledging that the target population for Figure 27 is different from 
Figure 26, it is still interesting to notice that if you examine Figures 26 and 27 together, 
opinions regarding CSD have trended similarly to the public opinion data presented in 
Figure 10.  Support for exercising the right to CSD has dropped to 23.0%, which is a 
10.1% drop.  Conversely, opposition to CSD has risen from 38.9% to 51.0% and those 
                                                 
73 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members 
and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 10, sub question 7, data is 
offered at the website of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate 
Schools for Law and Politics, available at:  http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html (accessed 
March 22, 2009).  Codebook for interpreting the data is available from Japan Political Research 
() 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), p. 273.  This author sorted the data from the 2007 Asahi 
Shimbun/University of Tokyo surveys to only include responses from incumbent members of the Upper 
House and the winners of the 2007 election.  Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current 
members of the Upper House. 
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who are undecided have dropped to only 15%.  It is also possible that the 2007 data is 
different than the 2005 data because the results were heavily influenced by the DPJ. 
 
Figure 28.  2007 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House:  Prime 
Minister Abe has established a private advisory agency to research CSD.  What is your 
thinking regarding the exercise of the right to CSD?  Please select only one.74 
The data presented here provides some more insight into how exactly Upper 
House members feel about CSD.  Specifically, it breaks down how respondents would 
like to see Japan exercise the right of CSD.  While 50% oppose exercising the right, 18% 
desire the more drastic option of Constitutional change and 13% would prefer a simpler 
interpretational change.  This data further strengthens the argument that a strong desire 
for a change in the government’s CSD policy does not exist within the Upper House.  A  
 
 
                                                 
74 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members 
and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 8, data is offered at the website 
of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and 
Politics, available at:  http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html (accessed March 22, 2009).  
Codebook for interpreting the data is available from Japan Political Research () 5, No. 1/2, 
(January 2008), p. 276.  This author sorted the data from the 2007 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo 
surveys to only include responses from incumbent members of the Upper House and the winners of the 
2007 election.  Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current members of the Upper House. 
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clear majority prefers the status quo while the opposition is divided over the best method 
for changing the policy.  Before moving on to the next section, it is interesting to examine 
party opinions on this issue. 
 
Figure 29.  2005 Mainichi Shimbun Survey of Lower House Members Question:  What 
do you think about the exercise of the right of CSD?75 
The data presented in Figure 29 is from a 2005 Lower House survey.  As 
discussed previously, it is possible that these numbers have changed in the intervening 
years.  However, the data is interesting because it shows a sharp difference in the 
opinions of the major political parties in Japan.  Clearly, the LDP has a strong contingent 
of members who favor the exercise of the right of CSD.  Conversely, Komeito is almost 
completely opposite.  To continue to be the ruling party, the LDP needs its coalition 
partner Komeito.  Thus, it is likely that the LDP has tempered its overtures to changing 
the interpretation on CSD out of respect for Komeito.  Also, the results of the DPJ show a 
mixed opinion regarding this issue with 50% opposing CSD and 39% supporting it. 
                                                 
75 Mainichi Shimbun, September 13, 2005, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission 
(), available at:  http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/sinbun/yoron/kokkai1709.htm (accessed 
March 22, 2009).  This survey targeted winners of the 2005 Lower House election.  The website does not 
provide the actual question used in the survey, but the question can be implied.  This author has taken the 
liberty to write the question the way it is implied.  Additionally, the data showed a dash (-) for the Komeito 
response of “It should be recognized”.  The context does not imply that the dash represents 0%.  It appears 
that the Private Sector Constitution Commission chose not to report the information. 
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The results of this section suggest that a removal of the ban on CSD is unlikely, 
given the recent drop in support for CSD within the Diet and the strong feelings of 
Komeito, which prevent the LDP from pursuing CSD. 
D. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
Unfortunately, there is no survey data that directly asks individual politicians their 
opinions regarding BMD.  However, it is possible to infer their thoughts about BMD by 
examining the answers to questions about the SDF, which is the organization that would 
operate Japan’s BMD system.  All of the survey data on the SDF was taken after Japan’s 
decision in 2003 to pursue its own BMD system, so it is logical to assume that 
respondents were aware of the BMD mission as they answered questions about the SDF. 
If there is support for an SDF that can act unhindered by restrictions, it may be an 
indication that politicians view the BMD program as a move towards a less restrictive 
security policy.  Conversely, if there is limited support for the SDF to become an 
unrestricted military power, it suggests that politicians do not view the BMD program as 
a new direction for Japan’s security policy. 
 
Figure 30.  2004 Mainichi Shimbun Survey of Both Houses of the Diet Question:  What 
is the most desirable scope of international activities for the SDF?76 
                                                 
76 Mainichi Shimbun, May 3, 2004, Question 11, website of the Private Sector Constitution 
Commission (), available at:  http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm (accessed March 
22, 2009).  According to the website, the survey was given to all Diet members except winners of the April 
25, 2004 Lower House by-elections and members missing from the Upper House. 
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The survey results presented in Figure 30 are from 2004, but are still significant 
because it reveals the entire Diet’s thoughts regarding the SDF.  The results reveal that 
there is a sharp divide between two camps.  Those who desire the SDF to support peace 
keeping operations (PKO)/disaster relief-type activities and those who desire the SDF to 
participate in U.N.-sanctioned activities.  Figure 31 will suggest that this divide has all 
but disappeared in recent years. 
 
Figure 31.  2007 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House:  How 
far do you think you would approve of overseas activities for the SDF?  From among the 
following, please choose the answer that is most close to your thoughts.77 
The most recent data available regarding this question is from the 2007 survey of 
the Upper House.  This survey had a different target population than the results presented 
in Figure 30 and the questions/answers are slightly different, so it is difficult to draw a 
                                                 
77 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members 
and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 5, data is offered at the website 
of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and 
Politics, available at:  http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html (March 22, 2009).  Codebook 
for interpreting the data is available from Japan Political Research () 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), 
p. 277.  This author sorted the data from the 2007 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo surveys to only 
include responses from incumbent members of the Upper House and the winners of the 2007 election.  
Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current members of the Upper House.  Additionally, there 
was a likely typo and an obscured kanji characters in two of the answers.  Thus, “given the current 
restrictions on the use of force, I approve of overseas activities,” and “I absolutely disapprove of overseas 
activities” are both inferred. 
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direct comparison between the two graphs.  However, the data presented in Figure 31 
suggests that the policy divide that existed in 2004 has disappeared and has been replaced 
by a strong consensus for approval of overseas activities as long as force is not used.  
Thus, a large majority within the Upper House opposes the use of force internationally. 
The author contends that the data presented in Figures 30 and 31 suggest that Diet 
members do not desire the SDF to engage in the unrestricted use of military force.  Since 
the SDF is the organization that operates the BMD system, it is assumed that this also 
applies to the Japanese BMD program.  There is nothing about the program itself to 
suggest that it would not fall within these expectations.  Fortunately, some more direct 
insight regarding BMD is available in party documents and is discussed in Chapter IV. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to determine if politicians support the removal of 
Japan’s restrictions on the use of military force.  The data clearly shows that there is no 
support among politicians for this to occur.  This is the same as the conclusion drawn 
from Chapter II.  This strongly suggests that a substantive change in Japan’s security 
policies is not imminent.  There are also several conclusions that can be drawn from the 
evidence. 
First, there is little support among politicians for any meaningful change to 
Japan’s restrictions.  Much like the public opinion data presented in Chapter II, 
politicians do not appear to support the removal of these restrictions.  Instead, what little 
support exists for change is focused more on issues such as legitimizing the SDF and 
clarifying Japan’s right to maintain forces for the purpose of self-defense.  
Second, politicians’ opinions regarding the SDF has shifted in recent years to 
strongly support an international role for the SDF as long as it does not involve the use of 
force.  This evidence suggests that we may see a broader international role for the SDF, 
but that role will focus on defense-oriented activities, such as peace-keeping and disaster 
relief. 
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Finally, the evidence on the SDF suggests that politicians do not view the BMD 
program as a step by Japan to a more aggressive security policy.  There is nothing 
exceptional about the BMD program itself to suggest that it would be excluded from the 
opinions expressed within this chapter.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
politicians expect the BMD program to conform to Japan’s existing restrictions on the 
use of military force. 
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IV. THE OPINIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
This chapter will focus on Japan’s two major political parties to determine 
whether they support a removal of the restrictions on the use of military force as a matter 
of policy.  Both the LDP and the DPJ have released various documents and statements 
that reveal their thoughts on all four key issues we have been examining.  Some may 
argue that this information is redundant in light of the evidence presented in Chapter III 
or that these published documents are not relevant.  These are good critiques and will 
now be addressed. 
First, this information is unique because it offers a different perspective of 
politicians’ opinions that the survey data presented in the previous chapter misses.  While 
survey data of Diet members offer insight into how individual politicians think on the 
various issues, the documents produced by each political party represents its consensus 
opinion on these issues and its official stance to the Japanese people.  As politicians with 
different ideas come together to discuss and debate the issues, they engage in 
compromise to reach their common goals.  The results of this process are the policies of 
the party, and these policies are of arguably greater significance than survey data which 
only represents individual opinions.  However, this does not mean that party opinion 
outweighs the opinions of individual politicians.  Rather, it is necessary to consider both 
in determining where Japan’ future security policy may go. 
Second, some may also argue about the relevancy of these documents to actual 
policies that are implemented.  Regarding this idea, this author points out the creation of 
written platforms by Japanese political parties is a relatively new phenomenon and 
therefore is not a routine that is redone every year.78  This suggests that the documents 
are likely accurate reflections of current party policy and thus there is reason to believe 
they are sincere. 
The information in this chapter is presented topically by party.  The LDP will be 
examined first because of its dominant position within Japanese domestic politics.  It has 
                                                 
78 Robert Weiner, personal communication, March 2009. 
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been the ruling party in Japan almost continually since its formation back in 1955.  The 
DPJ will then be considered.  It has only recently become a viable alternative party that 
could actually replace the LDP.  If the results of the Upper House election in 2007 are an 
indicator of what will happen in the Lower House of 2009, the opinions expressed by the 
DPJ could carry more weight in the calculations of what Japan’s future security policy 
will look like.  Therefore, the opinions as expressed by the DPJ are also a significant 
factor to consider. 
A. LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
1. Article 9 
In 2005, the LDP of Japan unveiled a draft Constitution which represented exactly 
how the LDP proposed that the Constitution be rewritten and thus offers insight into 
Japan’s future security policy.  The draft Constitution includes changes to many parts of 
the original Constitution.  For the purposes of this thesis, however, only the new Article 9 
will be examined. 
It is also important to mention that this document was unveiled in 2005 and thus 
does not necessarily reflect the LDP’s viewpoints now.  As the survey data revealed, 
there has been a recent decrease in support for Constitutional revision among Diet 
members.  Regardless of this decrease, however, the 2005 LDP draft Constitution is 
valuable because it reveals the consensus opinion of the LDP at the time of its writing. 
Also, this author will skip the first issue of Constitutional revision for the LDP.  
This is because the very fact that the LDP produced a draft Constitution implies that the 
party does favor some form of revision.  Thus, the first issue that will be examined is the 
LDP’s opinion on Article 9. 
The LDP’s draft Constitution does make changes to Article 9.  Article 9 from the 
current Japanese Constitution is composed of two paragraphs.  The LDP left the first 
paragraph unchanged, but did change paragraph two.  While the original Article 9 is 
presented in the first chapter of this thesis, it is also reproduced here for comparative 
purposes: 
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1947 Japanese Constitution 
Chapter II:  Renunciation of War 
Article 9 
Paragraph One:  Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on 
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign 
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling 
international disputes. 
Paragraph Two:  In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will 
never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized.79 
 
2005 LDP Draft Constitution 
Chapter II:  Security 
(Pacifism) 
Article 9 
Paragraph One:  No change 
(Self-Defense Army80) 
Paragraph Two:  Original paragraph two has been removed and replaced 
with the following four sections: 
To ensure our country’s peace and independence, as well as the security 
of our country and citizens, we shall maintain a Self-Defense Army with 
the Prime Minister of Japan as the supreme commander. 
                                                 
79Constitution of Japan, Article 9, website of the Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, available at: 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (accessed 
March 22, 2009).  The website provided the English translation. 
80 The kanji character translated as “Army” is the character “.”  In this context, this character does 
not necessarily mean just a land force, but a more inclusive word encompassing all military forces (land, 
sea, and air). 
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As determined by law, the Diet shall approve and control the Self-Defense 
Army with regard to the activities that they will accomplish in order to 
fulfill the provisions of the preceding paragraph. 
In addition to the missions spelled out in paragraph one, when decided by 
law, the Self-Defense Army can carry out activities that ensure the peace 
and security of the international community through international 
cooperation, maintain public order during emergency situations, as well 
as protect the lives and freedom of our citizens. 
Other than what has been explained in paragraph two, all matters related 
to the organization and regulation of the Self-Defense Army shall be 
decided by law.  [Italics added to indicate changes]81 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn regarding the LDP’s views from 
studying the changes they propose to Article 9.  First, it is notable that the title of Chapter 
II has been changed from the “Renunciation of War” to simply, “Security.”  Yet, the first 
paragraph of Article 9 (which spells out Japan’s renunciation of war) remained 
unchanged in the 2005 document.  This author concludes that the title change reflects the 
LDP’s desire for the new Constitution of Japan to include a security policy that is broader 
than the previous Constitution’s policy of simply renouncing war. 
Second, although the draft Constitution changed the SDF into an “army,” this 
army’s scope of activities would not be drastically different from the current SDF.  It is 
significant to notice that the LDP specifically renamed the SDF a “Self-Defense Army” 
(SDA).  This implies that the LDP wants this new army to be primarily for the purpose of 
self-defense.  This idea is clearly seen in public opinion and survey data as well.  The 
name change also suggests that the LDP was primarily concerned with removing the 
apparent contradiction between Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution and the existence of 
the SDF. 
                                                 
81Liberal Democratic Party’s New Constitution Draft, website of the Liberal Democratic Party, 
available at: http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/shin_kenpou/shiryou/pdf/051122_a.pdf (accessed March 22, 2009).  
There is no explanation of what the parenthesis are used to indicate.  This author assumes that the draft 
Constitution will not include these parenthetical comments and that they are simply there to provide readers 
a brief summary of what the changes are.  They would not be in a new Constitution if it was approved.  
Additionally, this author acknowledges that section 3 of paragraph two could be read to mean that the LDP 
would approve of use of military force internationally, but assumes that it refers to non-combat-related 
activities. 
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Thus, the LDP does want to revise Article 9.  However, the revisions they propose 
would not change the fundamental nature of Article 9.  Instead, the LDP proposed to 
legitimize the SDF while maintaining restrictions regarding the use of military force.  
This idea was reflected in the additional wording added to paragraph two of Article 9 that 
spelled out the rules and regulations that would govern the new SDA. 
2. Collective Self-Defense 
The LDP’s draft Constitution does not specifically deal with the issue of CSD.  
However, it has published documents that reveal its opinion regarding this matter.  The 
following document was created in 2004 and is entitled, “Points of Constitutional 
Revision:  Chief Points of Issue regarding Constitutional Revision.”  While the document 
contains six points of discussion, this chapter will only focus on a section of the second 
point entitled, “To Prepare for a State of Emergency by Creating a ‘Real Peace.’” 
To Prepare for a State of Emergency by Creating a “Real Peace” 
The fictitious nature of the Constitution’s Article 9 and endeavoring for 
the creation of a “Real Peace” 
Because Article 9 of the Constitution prohibits the maintenance of war 
potential, Japan does not have an army.  But because Japan is an 
independent country, it does have a self-defense force for self-defense. 
The heart of the postwar Constitutional discussion was the relationship 
between Article 9 and the SDF. 
Right now, many of the country’s citizens highly value the existence of 
the SDF.  Recently, the SDF has been allowed to labor at overseas Peace 
Keeping Operations and Humanitarian activities.  Some have pointed to 
the inadequacy of the constitutional interpretation that deployed personnel 
can use their weapons to protect themselves and their colleagues but 
cannot use their weapons to protect foreign troops or personnel from 
international organizations who are deployed to the same area and doing 





As for the interpretation that Article 9 prevents CSD, there is also the 
critique that it not only inflates the danger of lessening the U.S.-Japan 
alliance’s deterrent strength, but also is an obstacle to effective progress 
in collective security cooperation in Asia. 
Our aim in revising Article 9 is first to establish the SDF as an army.  
Next, it is also necessary to have the possibility of exercising the right of 
CSD. 
Presently, such things as international terrorism and the North Korean 
abduction issue exist and circumstances are not such that we can say “if 
we just publicize Article 9 of the Constitution, it will become peaceful.”  It 
is necessary to revise our Constitution’s Article 9 to guarantee our 
country’s and our citizens’ security.  [Italics added for emphasis]82 
This clearly spells out the LDP consensus view regarding the issue of CSD.  This 
stance is very consistent with survey data presented in the previous chapter.  Figure 29 
presented a 2005 Lower House survey and broke down the responses by party and 
revealed that 75% of the LDP believed that the right of CSD should be recognized. 
This document also reveals the reasons the LDP wants to change the existing 
policy on CSD.  First, it believes it is ridiculous that the SDF cannot fight to defend those 
who are working alongside them.  Second, it decreases the deterrent effect of the U.S.-
Japan alliance.  Third, it is a hindrance to the formation of a collective security 
arrangement by the countries in Asia.  Survey results on CSD presented in Chapter III 
revealed a recent decrease in the support rate for CSD.  However, the LDP has not 
removed this document, so this author assumes that it is still the official policy of the 
party. 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn based on these stated reasons.  
First, the LDP does not desire to change the current U.S.-Japan Alliance structure.  
Instead, their reason for changing the current interpretation of CSD has to do with 
removing the weaknesses in the alliance and ensuring it is viable. 
                                                 
82Liberal Democratic Party, “Points of Constitutional Revision:  Chief Points of Issue regarding 
Constitutional Revision” website of the Liberal Democratic Party, available at: 
http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/jimin/2004_seisaku/kenpou/contents/02.html (accessed March 22, 2009). 
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Interestingly, the second conclusion is that the LDP appears to also be interested 
in pursuing a collective security arrangement with other nations.  This is suggested by the 
LDP’s stated comment regarding the current CSD policy’s negative effect on the creation 
of a collective security arrangement among the nations of Asia.  The participants of this 
arrangement are not specified and it is logical to assume that the United States would 
likely be a member of any arrangement.  However, it is interesting that the LDP wants to 
expand Japan’s security policies from reliance only upon the United States.  As stated 
above, this does not mean a lessening of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, but rather that the LDP 
is interested in expanding Japan’s security policy to include other nations as well. 
3. Ballistic Missile Defense 
In December of 2003, Japan’s Cabinet Office published its official statement that 
Japan had decided to introduce a BMD system.  The document was authored by the then-
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, who would later go on to become Prime Minister 
from 2007 to 2008.  In it, he laid out the government’s view on BMD.  As the main 
player in the government’s ruling coalition, this author assumes that this statement is a 
good reflection of the LDP’s own views.  Relevant portions of the statements are printed 
below: 
2.  The Government of Japan, recognizing that rapid progress on the 
relevant technologies of BMD has recently been made and that 
technological feasibility of BMD system is high, and noting that BMD 
system is suitable for our exclusively defensive national defense policy, 
decided to introduce the multi-layered defense system based on the Aegis 
BMD system and Patriot PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3). 
4.  BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, without 
alternatives, to protect life and property of the citizens of Japan against 
ballistic missile attacks, and meets the principle of exclusively defense-
oriented national defense policy. Therefore, it is considered that this 
presents no threat to neighboring countries, and does not affect the 
regional stability. 
5.  As for the issue of the right of collective self-defense, the BMD system 
that the Government of Japan is introducing aims at defending Japan. It 
will be operated based on Japan's independent judgment, and will not be 
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used for the purpose of defending third countries. Therefore, it does not 
raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-
defense. The BMD system requires interception of missiles by Japan's own 
independent judgment based on the information on the target acquired by 
Japan's own sensors. 
6.  In legal terms on the operation of the BMD system, interception of 
ballistic missile attack is basically conducted under Defense Operations 
Order in Armed Attack Situation. In addition, due to the nature of ballistic 
missile and the characteristics of BMD, the Government will conduct 
specific studies on necessary measures including legal ones, which enable 
appropriate responses to each situation.  [Italics added for emphasis]83 
From the above four paragraphs, it is possible to draw several conclusions about 
the LDP’s view of BMD.  First, the LDP understands that the introduction of a BMD 
system may not be completely compatible with current Constitutional restrictions.  Both 
paragraphs 2 and 4 include specific language explaining the strictly defensive nature of 
the BMD system.  However, it is interesting that they still had to include paragraph 6, 
which explains how the government will work to enact measures that will allow the BMD 
system to be used in specific situations.  Based on this, it is obvious that the LDP does 
acknowledge some of the complications posed to a BMD system by Japan’s restrictions. 
Second, the LDP is committed to resolve those complications through any means 
including legal measures.  Based on the language in paragraphs 2 and 4, it is logical to 
assume that the LDP wants to resolve the complications, while still maintaining Japan’s 
current security policy.  Thus, it can be assumed that whatever measures are undertaken 
to allow the use of BMD within Japan, they will not fundamentally change the 
restrictions that currently exist in Japan. 
B. DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN 
The DPJ has emerged only recently as a serious alternative to the long-ruling 
LDP.  However, it has produced significant documents that reveal the collective opinions 
                                                 
83“Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary 19 December 2003,” from the website of the Prime 
Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html (accessed March 23, 2009).  This website 
provided the English translation. 
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of the party regarding many of the issues voters care about.  This section will examine the 
documents that deal specifically with the issues of relevance to this thesis. 
The first document is the DPJ’s “Constitutional Proposal,” which was published 
in October of 2005.  This document is not as specific as the LDP’s draft Constitution, but 
offers insight into the DPJ’s views on issues like Article 9.  The LDP’s document allowed 
a line-by-line comparison with the 1947 Constitution, but the DPJ document is not 
presented in this manner.  Instead, it presents the ideas and the framework from which the 
party approaches Constitutional revision.  From this, it is possible to understand the 
DPJ’s consensus opinions on certain security issues. 
1. Constitutional Revision and Article 9 Revision 
DPJ Constitutional Proposal 31 Oct 2005 
Section 5 “Towards Forming a More Certain Security Framework” 
1. The Basic Thinking of the DPJ 
1. Putting pacifism, as the basic norm of the Constitution, at the core 
In the first place, Japan’s Constitution is based on the U.N. charter and the 
system of collective security rooted therein.  Given this, Japan, through 
Article 9, has exemplified the spirit of the U.N. Charter, which generally 
prohibits the unilateral use of force, and has zealously promulgated 
pacifist principles. 
The country of Japan desires U.N. collective security to be sufficient and 
so, we aspire to ordinarily endeavor towards a realization of that.  And, in 
light of that intention and reflecting upon the historical use of unrestricted 
force in the name of the “right of self-defense,” Japan’s Constitution shall 
create equally rigid regulations regarding the exercise of the right of self-
defense as well as to the prohibition of its use. 
For this purpose, consistent, strong arguments have been aired regarding 
the method of participation in U.N.-sanctioned collective security 
activities.  But, how can we pass beyond the arguments?  We can through 
the one important, foundational model principle that the Japanese 
Constitution is based on, “pacifism.”  Regarding “pacifism,” it has taken 
root deeply within the citizen’s livelihoods and we should declare the style 
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of peace-loving Japan to our citizens as well as overseas.  From now on, 
we should pass it on.  What is important is that Japan becomes “a country 
that creates peace” or rather “a new Japan that manufactures peace” as we 
move on from what we were, “a Japan that received peace.” 
2.  Without permitting our Constitution to become meaningless, advancing 
towards the establishment of a more certain pacifism 
For the establishment of international peace and the realization of Japan’s 
pacifism, now, the most dangerous things are the making of our 
Constitution into a meaningless document through Constitutional revision 
via interpretation which has no brakes, and the continuance of the 
idea/attitude that we will provide unclear efforts towards active 
cooperation with international society. The DPJ will not get caught up in 
accommodationist constitutional interpretation, at whose core has been a 
CLB [Cabinet Legislation Bureau] that has repeated these two mistakes, 
but will instead aim to establish a more certain path of Japanese pacifism, 
and to pursue nation-building that contributes broadly to international 
society and earns the trust of Asia and the world. 
Through a diverse and free, broad-minded Constitutional debate, 1) 
regarding the “right of self-defense,” without approving of the vague, 
circumstances-driven principles of Constitutional interpretation, we shall 
define a more rigid/strict “limited right of self defense” that reflects the 
framework of international law, 2) we will make the framework for 
international contributions a more certain thing, and after putting the 
brakes on our government’s selfish interpretation of Constitutional 
application, we will tackle the establishment of a Constitution for our 
nation.  Together, we shall define our nation’s active role towards 
supporting what today’s international community desires, “Human 
Security.”  [Italics added for emphasis]84 
This section is entitled “The Basic Thinking of the DPJ” and from it, much can be 
understood of the DPJ’s political opinion on security issues.  First, the DPJ wants to 
revise the Constitution.  It makes clear its disapproval of the government’s current 
method of dealing with security issues through inconsistent Constitutional interpretations. 
 
 
                                                 
84Democratic Party of Japan, “Democratic Party of Japan Constitutional Proposal” October 31, 2005, 
p. 14,  website of the Democratic Party of Japan, available at:  
http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/files/20051031181802.pdf (accessed March 22, 2009). 
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Instead, the DPJ states its desire to create a new Constitution, which will clearly establish 
the framework for Japan’s security policy, including how they will participate in 
international activities. 
Second, the DPJ is both strongly committed to, and proud of, the principle of 
pacifism.  It is impossible to read this section and not come away with a sense of the 
DPJ’s firm commitment to the principles of pacifism as described in Article 9.  They 
envision Japan as a country that can help to create international peace by spreading the 
idea of pacifism at home and abroad.  It can be inferred from this that the DPJ does not 
want to revise the fundamental principles of Article 9. 
Third, the DPJ wants to create a more restrictive definition of the right of self-
defense.  Based on this document, it is not satisfied with the current definition and wants 
to impose stronger restrictions on the exercise of this right.  The DPJ gives more detail 
regarding its new definition in a later section entitled, “Four Principles and Two 
Prerequisites of the Constitution Relating to Our Nation’s Security.”  The DPJ’s stance 
on what is allowed under self-defense is presented in Principle #2 below: 
 
DPJ Constitutional Proposal 31 Oct 2005 
Section 5 “Towards Forming a More Certain Security Framework” 
Four Principles and Two Prerequisites of the Constitution Relating to Our 
Nation’s Security 
Four principles relating to our nation’s security activities 
2.  Defining the “Limited Right of Self Defense,” for the U.N Charter as 
described above 
Having reflected upon the fact that the last war was prosecuted under the 
name of “the right to self defense,” “limited self defense” is specified 
clearly in the Constitution.  The “self-defense” specified in Article 51 of 
the U.N. Charter is limited to emergency refuge-like activities conducted 
before U.N. collective security activities begin.  This is important part of 
the “non-aggressive defense policy” kind of thinking that was fostered in 
postwar Japan.  In light of this, a much more rigid application of 
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international law and Constitutions shall be established, while suppressing 
the selfish interpretations of self-defense that are given by governments.  
[Italics added for emphasis]85 
Based on this more restrictive definition, it is logical to assume that the DPJ 
would not support any Constitutional revision that would allow an unrestricted use of 
military force. 
2. Collective Self-Defense 
CSD is also covered in the section entitled, “The Four Principles and Two 
Prerequisites of the Constitution that Relates to Our Nation’s Security.”  Principles #1 
and #3 as well as Prerequisite #1 offer insight into how the DPJ views the issue of CSD.  
They will now be presented: 
DPJ Constitutional Proposal 31 Oct 2005 
Section 5 “Towards Forming a More Certain Security Framework” 
Four Principles and Two Prerequisites of the Constitution Relating to Our 
Nation’s Security 
Four principles relating to our nation’s security activities 
1. To believe in the pacifist thoughts that postwar Japan fostered. 
The pacifism of Japan’s Constitution is based on these foundational 
standards:  “the sovereignty of the people,” and “respect for basic human 
rights.”  From now on, even during Constitutional discussions, we need 
make these foundational intents the basis, and, without looking to our own 
nation, have the attitude of being willing to engage in U.N.-sanctioned 
international activities and cooperation to deal with those who threaten 
international peace. 
                                                 
85 Democratic Party of Japan, “Democratic Party of Japan Constitutional Proposal” October 31, 2005, 
p. 15,  website of the Democratic Party of Japan, available at: 
http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/files/20051031181802.pdf (accessed March 22, 2009). 
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3.  To place our participation in the U.N.’s collective security activities. 
The constitution addresses participation in UN-led peacekeeping activities, 
removing vague and arbitrary interpretations and establishing clear 
guidelines.  In this way, it distinguishes between peacekeeping activities 
based on legitimate decision-making by the UN and all other activities, 
and clarifies that it is the will of the Japanese people not to participate in 
the latter.  This posture makes it possible to participate in multinational 
force activities and UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) currently 
underway as part of the UN’s collective security activities.  Those 
activities may include the use of force as part of collective self defense, but 
Japan may autonomously determine its degree of participation in this. 
Two prerequisites that must be met before the four principles that relate to 
our nation’s security can be born 
1.  Armed force must be maximally suppressed. 
Even regarding the newly specified “right of self defense,” we must 
remain true to the idea of “non-aggressive defense policy” developed by 
postwar Japan and keep the use of force to the absolute minimum 
necessary.  Again, even regarding participation in U.N.-sanctioned 
collective security activities, a strong suppressing attitude towards the use 
of armed force must be put into place.  This guideline must be specified in 
Constitutions with an attachment that relates to basic security laws.  
[Italics added for emphasis]86 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn about the DPJ’s view of CSD.  
First, the DPJ only supports collective security, not CSD.  While these terms may be 
similar, they do not the same thing.  Hughes provides a good explanation: 
‘Collective security’ is seen to differ from ‘collective self-defense’ in that 
the latter is an inherent right under the UN Charter that can be exercised 
without UN approval in instances where it is deemed necessary to defend 





                                                 
86Democratic Party of Japan, Constitutional Proposal, October 31, 2005, website of the Democratic 
Party of Japan, pp. 15-16, available at:  http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/files/SG0065.pdf (accessed March 22, 
2009). 
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former is a right that can only be exercised if sanctioned by the UN and is 
for the purposes of collective retaliation by UN members against an 
aggressor.87 
Second, the DPJ believes that it is possible for Japan to participate in collective 
security activities that may entail the use of force.  However, Principle #3 states that it is 
up to the Japanese people to decide exactly what level of participation they can bring.  
The DPJ is very explicit that any use of force must be under the auspices of the United 
Nations, but it is very interesting that the DPJ is willing for Japan to use force and this is 
a significant difference between the DPJ and the LDP. 
Third, despite its willingness to use force internationally, the DPJ believes that the 
amount of force to be used must be kept to an absolute minimum.  To them, this is in 
keeping with the defensively focused security policy that Japan has had since 1947.  It 
appears that the DPJ would like this idea to be fully embraced by the international 
community as well. 
3. The Self-Defense Forces 
Chapters II and III did not specifically examine the SDF, but rather looked at 
opinions on this issue to try to infer ideas about BMD.  However, in light of the LDP’s 
idea to create an SDA, it would be appropriate to also examine the DPJ’s plan for the 
SDF.  It is presented in the following policy document  
Democratic Party of Japan Magna Carta 
Chapter III:  Build Peace Ourselves:  Diplomacy and Security Policy 
Paragraph 7:  Limit the exercise of the right of self defence to an 
exclusively defensive stance  
We will play an active role in preserving the peace of Japan and the world, 
based on the philosophy of the Japanese Constitution. Regardless of past 
debate regarding the concepts of individual and collective self defence, the 
right to self defence will only be exercised, in accordance with Article 9 
                                                 
87 Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power, p. 50. 
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and based on the principle of exclusively defensive security, if our nation 
is faced with an imminent and unlawful infringement that directly 
threatens the peace and security of Japan. We will not engage in the use of 
force in any other case.  [Italics added for emphasis]88 
From this paragraph the DPJ’s consensus view of the SDF can be inferred.  While 
no specific mention is made of the SDF, it is clear that the DPJ wants to narrow the scope 
of activities that the SDF can be involved in.  However, based on the DPJ’s opinion 
regarding CSD, it is assumed that the DPJ would approve of the SDF participating in 
international activities that are sanctioned by the United Nations. 
Contrasting this view with the LDP, it is interesting to note that this is a 
fundamentally different opinion between these two major parties.  The LDP wants to 
change the name of the SDF, but not change the scope of its activities (by continuing to 
focus on defensive activities).  Conversely, the DPJ does not want to change the name of 
the SDF, but wants to increase the scope of its activities (by allowing use of force under 
the United Nations). 
4. Ballistic Missile Defense 
In 2003, before Chief Cabinet Secretary published his statement regarding Japan’s 
introduction of a BMD system, the DPJ offered up its opinion regarding the same issue.  
The DPJ statement was authored by Matsumoto Takeaki, who was serving as the “Next” 
Director General of the Defense Agency.  The title of “Next” simply means that he was 
the chosen individual to head the Defense Agency if the DPJ came into power.  It is a 
similar concept to Britain’s “shadow cabinet.”  The statement was entitled, “Regarding 
the introduction of ballistic missile defense 9 December 2003 (A Conversation)”: 
DPJ Next Director General of Defense Agency Matsumoto Takeaki 
Today, the government decided on the introduction of ballistic missile 
defense (MD). 
                                                 
88Democratic Party of Japan, Basic Policies for Government (Policy Magna Carta), December 2006, 
website of the Democratic Party of Japan, available at:  
http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/basic2006.html#anchor37 (accessed March 22, 2009).  The website 
provided the English translation. 
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Missile defense has a character that agrees with the spirit of 
nonaggressive defense, as a defensive step, and I think embarking on an 
examination of it is above mere security, but an obligation/duty.  For that 
purpose, the DPJ will continue with “an examination of cost-effectiveness 
and synthetic point of view to appraise its necessity” (Administration’s 
public platform/Manifesto).  At the same time, MD has the possibility of 
changing the trend of our nation’s security policy in a big way and it is 
essential to discuss the overall picture.  All together, we must examine the 
practical possibilities of the three principles of arms export, or the right of 
collective self-defense, as well as the understanding of our neighboring 
countries. 
But there is no sense of this type of thinking, or of efforts to explain this to 
foreign countries, on the part of the government.  The government should 
fully discharge its explanatory responsibilities.  [Italics added for 
emphasis]89 
There are several conclusions regarding the DPJ’s collective opinion that can be 
drawn based on Matsumoto’s statement.  First, the DPJ is in agreement with the LDP 
regarding the defensive nature of the BMD system.  This is remarkable because it shows 
a convergence of opinions between two parties.  This lends credibility to the argument 
that the BMD system is strictly defensive because if it was not, the DPJ would surely use 
this opportunity to criticize and attack the LDP.  Instead, it acknowledges up front that 
the system is defensive. 
Second, despite the belief that the BMD system is defensive, the DPJ is also 
aware of some of the complications that are created by the introduction of a BMD system.  
Whereas the LDP commits itself to the resolution of these issues, the DPJ merely 
suggests that an examination is needed. 
Finally, the DPJ feels the BMD system may cause problems with Japan’s policy 
on CSD and arms exports as well as Japan’s relations with its neighbors.  This is different  
 
 
                                                 
89Matsumoto Takeaki, “Regarding the introduction of ballistic missile defense 9 December 2003,” 
from the Democratic Party of Japan’s website, available at http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=10505 
(accessed March 22, 2009). 
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from the LDP opinion, which does not believe there is a problem.  The DPJ does not 
make any recommendations regarding how to resolve this issue, but merely blames the 
government for not doing enough. 
C. CONCLUSION 
An examination of the policy positions of Japan’s two leading political parties 
reveals two differences in the key issues that we have been discussing.  The first 
difference regards each party’s view of the SDF.  The LDP wants to revise the 
Constitution to acknowledge the existence of the SDF and to change its name to 
something more in line with its nature, a Self-Defense Army (SDA).  The activities of 
this SDA would include participation in international activities, but would not include the 
use of force apart from defensive activities.  Aside from the name change, this proposal is 
essentially a continuation of the current status quo. 
Conversely, the DPJ prefers more limited activities for the SDF unless it is in 
support of U.N.-sanctioned actions.  Additionally, it wants to tighten its definition of 
what is allowed under self-defense to limit how much force would be appropriate.  But it 
must be acknowledged that the approval for the use of force would be a definite departure 
from Japan’s status quo. 
The second difference involves the issue of CSD.  The LDP supports Japan’s 
involvement in CSD, but the DPJ does not.  Instead, the DPJ supports Japan’s 
involvement in collective security activities that are sanctioned by the United Nations.  
As stated above it is significant that the DPJ is willing to allow Japan to use military 
force as long as those actions are supported by the United Nations. 
Excepting the differences on the SDF and CSD, both parties are essentially in 
agreement on all the other issues.  Both parties have offered concrete examples of how 
they would change the Constitution indicating that they would be willing to engage in 
this activity.  Both parties’ agree that the vital nature of Article 9 should not be changed 
and both parties agree on the strictly defensive nature of BMD. 
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V. CONCLUSION / IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Now that an examination of all the evidence is complete, this thesis will analyze 
two arguments that are made by those who believe Japan is about to remove its 
restrictions on the use of military force:  Based on the literature review in Chapter I, these 
arguments can be summarized in the following way:  1) Japan will remove its restrictions 
because of its worsening security environment; 2) Japan’s involvement in BMD will 
force Japan to allow the exercise of CSD. 
A. ASSESSING ARGUMENT #1:  JAPAN WILL REMOVE ITS 
RESTRICTIONS BECAUSE OF ITS WORSENING SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT 
The reasoning of this argument makes intuitive sense.  It is only logical to assume 
that a state will react to external dangers by ensuring its ability to respond appropriately.  
Japan’s current security environment has arguably gotten much more threatening in 
recent years due to the current North Korean missile threat, as well as the possible future 
dangers of China’s military modernization.  If Japan was going to respond to these 
external threats, now would be an understandable time.  Perhaps surprisingly, the 
evidence does not support this argument. 
Despite a strong awareness among the public of many of these dangerous 
situations, it does not appear to have translated into a desire for a change in Japan’s 
security policy.  Instead, the evidence shows that public support for Constitutional 
revision has actually fallen in recent years.  It is not as definitive, but the evidence also 
suggests the support has fallen among politicians as well.  Specifically regarding Article 
9, the evidence shows that both the public and the politicians do not support a revision of 
the article that would represent a fundamental change from Japan’s pacifist traditions. 
The evidence is not quite as clear regarding the exercise of the right to CSD.  The 
LDP’s official stance does support it.  However, it does appear that support from both the 
public and the politicians has dropped in recent years.  Therefore, the evidence presented  
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in this thesis suggests that Argument #1 is incorrect.  Despite the worsening security 
environment, Japan does not appear to have experienced an increase in a desire for the 
removal of its restrictions on the use of military force. 
B. ASSESSING ARGUMENT #2:  JAPAN’S INVOLVEMENT IN BMD WILL 
FORCE JAPAN TO ALLOW THE EXERCISE OF CSD 
As discussed in Chapter I, some have pointed out that a Japanese BMD program 
may cause problems with the prohibition on CSD.  None of the evidence examined 
within this thesis deals with the technical issues of how a Japanese BMD program would 
operate.  However, the evidence does suggest that Japan will do what it takes to ensure 
that its BMD program does not violate the existing restrictions regarding CSD.  Even if it 
was impossible to operate a completely independent system, it is likely that Japan would 
respond by employing a flexible interpretation to ensure that its prohibition of CSD is not 
violated. 
As discussed in Section A above, support for CSD is decreasing.  Additionally, 
Fukuda’s statement presented in Chapter IV demonstrated that the LDP is aware of the 
challenges posed by a BMD system and that it was committed to resolving those 
differences.  The DPJ is also aware of the potential problems.  It is also officially opposed 
to CSD so it is logical to assume that if it did take power in 2009, it would not allow 
BMD to violate the rules on CSD. 
C. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE VALIDITY OF THE HYPOTHESIS 
The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the hypothesis is correct:  
Japan is not about to remove its current restrictions on the use of military force because 
of the strength of its anti-military feelings which exist within the society, at both the 
political and public level.  The existence of this anti-military norm is evident in all three 
areas examined within this thesis: the opinions of the public and the politicians, as well as 
the published documents of the two major political parties.  While few can dispute the 
existence of this norm within society, the true question is how much of an effect does it 
have on Japan’s security policy? 
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With respect to Constitutional revision, the requirement for a national referendum 
is a formidable obstacle that must be acknowledged.  Without public support, it is 
impossible to change the current Constitution and this thesis has clearly demonstrated 
strong public opinion against removing Japan’s existing restrictions.  Without a 
Constitutional revision, it is impossible for Japan to change Article 9. 
The other possible change would involve an interpretive change to allow the 
exercise of CSD.  This would not involve a national referendum and is therefore not 
directly influenced by public opinion.  However, it is affected by the opinions of 
politicians.  The evidence suggests that support among politicians for CSD has fallen in 
recent years.  Despite the LDP’s desire for CSD, it still must deal with its coalition 
partner, Komeito, who does not support CSD.  Therefore, an interpretive change does not 
appear likely.  Additionally, the DPJ’s official stance against CSD makes it even more 
likely for CSD to be allowed if the DPJ takes power in 2009. 
Finally, it is interesting to consider if there are certain tipping points that may 
cause Japan to remove its restrictions.  Perhaps an actual attack by North Korea or a 
definitely aggressive move by China would provide enough impetus for Japan to remove 
its restrictions.  However, this author wonders if the depth of anti-military feelings within 
Japanese society might still be deep enough to prevent Japan from removing its 
restrictions on the use of military force. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
This thesis will now offer some concluding thoughts on what the evidence 
presented in this thesis implies for future U.S. policy towards Japan.  The data suggests 
that a less restrictive Japanese security policy and greater military involvement in the 
Japan-U.S. alliance is not about to occur.  The data also suggests the existence of a 
political “red line” that the government of Japan will not cross in its international 
activities.  This “red line” is the unrestricted use of military force overseas. 
The data also reveals that there is strong support both at the public and politician 
levels for a greater level of involvement by Japan in non-combat-related activities.  This 
reinforces the idea that the United States should increase its efforts to secure Japanese 
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cooperation on non-combat-related activities.  Considering the demonstrated eagerness of 
the Japanese to play a larger role in international non-combat-related roles, it would not 
be too difficult politically to receive greater participation from Japan in these types of 
activities.  This participation could improve the effectiveness of the alliance by relieving 
some of the burden borne by the United States and allowing a capable ally to leverage its 
abilities towards the fulfillment of a common goal. 
Japan’s role in these non-combat-related activities could be in one of two forms.  
The first could involve Japan actually taking over and accomplishing certain non-combat-
related parts of the missions that the United States has traditionally done.  The second 
form would be to have Japan supplement U.S. efforts overseas by providing some of vital 
reconstruction efforts that otherwise the United States may not be able to provide.  
Regardless of the way it is carried out, the end result would be an increase in the 
effectiveness of the alliance. 
The evidence also suggests there is a possible limitation to the level of Japan’s 
involvement in future international activities.  There appears to be some opposition to 
Japan’s participation in these types of activities without the sanction of the United 
Nations.  This thought is best expressed by the DPJ, which may become the ruling party 
in Japan after the elections to be held later this year. 
This implication suggests that future Japanese international cooperation with the 
United States may be contingent upon a U.N. resolution.  Without it, there could likely be 
opposition to cooperation in what could be seen by Japan as U.S. unilateralism.  The 
United States would have to recognize that without strong support from the U.N., 
Japanese cooperation may not occur. 
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